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This dissertation presents two essays in Corporate Finance.
In the first essay, I study how political institutions a↵ect corporate investment through
the policy uncertainty channel. I examine investment response to changes in the abil-
ity of the governing party to implement its political agenda due to checks and balances.
I use US gubernatorial elections from 1978 to 2010 and a regression discontinuity de-
sign to estimate the causal e↵ects of giving a single party full versus split control over
a state government. I find that shifts from a divided to a unified government depress
investment and job creation. Investment drops by an average of 3 to 5 percent in the
year after the election giving a single party control of the government. The e↵ect is
not limited to public firms, is stronger for firms operating in a single state and firms
with more irreversible investment. The findings support the hypothesis that moving
from divided to unified government translates into policy uncertainty, which in turn
a↵ects the investment and employment cycles.
The second essay is joint with William Mullins and Christophe Cahn.
How to support private lending to SMEs during aggregate contractions is a crucial but
still open policy question. This paper exploits an unexpected drop in 2012 in the cost
of funding bank loans to some firms but not others in France to uncover how banks
adjust their SME lending portfolios in a crisis. The cost reduction causes bank debt
to rise and payment defaults with suppliers to fall, providing evidence that funding
cost can be an e↵ective policy lever. The e↵ect is driven by firms with only one bank
relationship, a numerous but understudied group. The size of the e↵ect varies, with
additional credit flowing to firms with stronger observables, to high growth firms, to
firms with high demand, and to firms with a deeper banking relationship. Further,
a richer relationship appears to substitute for stronger observables in the lending
decision. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that, compared to multi-bank firms,
single bank firms are particularly credit constrained in crisis periods.
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1 CHAPTER 1: THE REAL EFFECTS OF CHECKS AND BALANCES : POL-
ICY UNCERTAINTY AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT
1.1 Introduction
Is political compromise good for business? In the wake of the high profile political
crisis the US experienced in 2013, which led to a two-week long partial shutdown of
the Federal government in October, the question of the real e↵ects of having a split
partisan control of the government has been widely debated.
How politics shape economic outcomes is a research question of long standing. The
earlier literature focuses on the impacts of politics on the macroeconomy (see Drazen
(2001) for a survey), showing strong evidence of partisan business cycles in the US
(Alesina and Sachs (1988); Alesina et al. (1997)).
More recently a micro-based literature has explored which underlying channels could
drive a causal e↵ect of political cycles on financial markets and firm-level outcomes.
Government spending (Belo et al. (2013); Cohen et al. (2011)), campaign contribu-
tions (Cooper et al. (2010); Akey and Lewellen (2015)), changes in the degree of
political connectedness (Faccio (2006); Fisman (2001)), or political uncertainty (Julio
and Yook (2012)) have been shown to matter in explaining how political cycles influ-
ence.
Most of these analyses look at the impact of politics on corporate activities through
the lens of the partisan business cycle theory, in particular using the party controlling
the executive to identify partisan preferences over economic policy. Institutions, and
1
how they e↵ectively impact the ability of the Democratic or Republican parties to
implement their political agenda, have received less attention. Over the past forty
years in the US, the periods in which the President party fully controls both the
legislative and the executive powers (unified government henceforth) have been more
the exception than the rule. 1
At the state level, half of US states are divided on average between 1978 and 2010.2
This includes so called split branch governments, where the governor is confronted
with majorities from the opposing party in both chambers, as well as split legislatures,
when di↵erent parties hold the upper and lower houses.
This paper investigates the real impact of this dynamic of within-government counter-
balancing on firm investment and hiring decisions. I empirically analyze whether,
and to what extent, changes in government party control from a divided (unified)
to a unified (divided) government, in the US, at the state level, are associated with
adjustments in corporate investment and employment. The first parts of the paper
are devoted to estimate causal e↵ects of checks and balances on firm investment
and employment policy, while the last part of it investigates policy uncertainty as a
potential channel to explain the documented e↵ects.
1Since 1977, the US government has been unified in 1977-1981 under the Democratic presidency
of James Carter; in 1993-1995, under the Democratic presidency of William J. Clinton; in 2003-
2007 under the Republican presidency of George W. Bush and in 2009-2011 under the Democratic
presidency of Barack Obama.
2As of 2016, nineteen states are in split partisan control situations, including Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York and Pennsylvania.
2
State policy matters
US State governments have substantial power in shaping the economic environment in
which firms operate. They can a↵ect corporate profitability directly (e.g., through tax
code, labor regulations or business incentives policies) or indirectly (through customer
demand or sentiment). Legislatures in most states (34 states plus the District of
Columbia) can approve tax bills with a simple majority vote in each house. Most
states have industry specific or targeted programs designed to incentivize investment
within the state (for example, aimed at green energy technology). Minimum wage
laws and regulations on collective bargaining, which a↵ect labor costs, also vary at
the state level. While firms do not explicitly mentioned elections or partisan politics
as a source of risk, state level policy is often identified as a source of uncertainty in
the risk factors section of their 10-K reports (cf. examples cited in footnote).3
3INNODATA, headquartered in NJ, incorporated in DE, 10-K 2012. Provider of business process
and IT services “Measures aimed at limiting or restricting outsourcing by US companies are under
discussion in Congress and in numerous state legislatures. While no substantive anti-outsourcing
legislation has been introduced to date, given the ongoing debate over this issue, the introduction of
such legislation is possible. If introduced, our business, financial condition and results of operations
could be adversely a↵ected and our ability to service our clients could be impaired”.
CARDIAC SCIENCE, headquartered in Washington state, incorporated in Delaware, 10-K 2003.
Health Industry (medical devices manufacturer). “Federal, state and local governments have adopted
a number of healthcare policies intended to curb rising healthcare costs. There have been and may
continue to be proposals by legislators, regulators and third-party payers to keep these costs down.
Certain proposals, if passed, could impose limitations on the prices we will be able to charge for our
products (...). These limitations could have a material adverse e↵ect on our financial position and
results of operations”.
ALABAMA GAS CORP, headquartered and incorporated in Alabama, 10-K 2012. Oil & Gaz
Company. “Federal, state and local legislative bodies and agencies frequently exercise their respec-
tive authority to adopt new laws and regulations and to amend and interpret existing laws and
regulations. (...) Currently, there are various proposed law and regulatory changes with the po-
tential to materially mpact the Company. (...) Due to the nature of the political and regulatory
processes and based on its consideration of existing proposals, the Company is unable to determine
whether such proposed laws and regulations are reasonably likely to be enacted or to determine, if
enacted, the magnitude of the potential impact of such laws (...)”.
NB: these examples have been generated with the help of Don Bowen, by searching the body of
10-K reports available in the EDGAR SEC database, for keywords related to state level policy such
as state legislature, state government, gubernatorial elections, Governor etc.
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Though the e↵ects of state government policies are potentially smaller than those
of federal policy, they are by no means insignificant both on average (state taxes
account for 21% of total corporate income taxes paid (Heider and Ljungqvist (2015))
and especially for a subset of firms. Anecdotal evidence such as the January 2015
decision of Daimler AG to relocate its Mercedes-Benz USAs headquarters from New
Jersey to an Atlanta suburb, illustrates the relevance of state politics to corporate
decisions, with firms willing to take advantage of low union membership in right-to-
work states, and lower corporate taxes. Significant impact of state-level policies on
corporate decisions has been documented in the financial literature, in particular for
smaller, less geographically diversified, firms (Colak et al. (2015); Wald and Long
(2007)).
In this paper I use the outcomes of 408 gubernatorial elections held between 1978
and 2010, in 46 states, as exogenously timed changes in state full versus split parti-
san control. The elections resulted into 82 staggered switches from divided to unified
governments and 64 switches from unified to divided governments. The timing of
elections is exogenously determined by the political calendar of each state and is in-
dependent of economic conditions. This mitigates endogeneity concerns that changes
in investment in the post election year may be induced by changes in business cy-
cles. However, it does not rule out reverse causality, because economic outcomes also
directly influence election results.
Establishing causality looking at a small number of Presidential elections is challeng-
ing. Shifting the analysis to the state level o↵ers the researcher more power because
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changes in partisan control alignment (from a divided to a unified government and
conversely) are numerous, spread across time and geographically dispersed across
states. Indeed states are a↵ected by the same national macro factors but gubernato-
rial elections in di↵erent states occur in di↵erent years so that electoral outcomes are
dispersed over the business cycle.
The concerns that the state of the economy influences election outcomes is thus
alleviated by the fact that identification relies both on within state time variation as
well as on across state variation. In the spirit of a triple di↵erence-in-di↵erences, the
first treatment level is the occurrence (or absence) of a gubernatorial election in the
state of the firm in a given year, and the second treatment level is whether or not
this election, if held, resulted in a switch from a divided to a unified government or
from a unified to a divided government.
To address remaining concerns that unobserved state-level economic conditions or
anticipated state-level economic conditions may be driving both the election outcomes
and the investment/employment cycle, I use a regression discontinuity design. Recent
contributions implementing a similar design in gubernatorial elections include Folke
and Snyder (2012) and Erikson et al. (2015). As stated by Erikson et al. (2015),
“the basic idea behind this, is that in very close elections the party of the governor
is decided essentially by a coin flip”. Thus, looking at a sub-sample of states that
were divided ex-ante, those states that became unified because a governor barely
won an election and those that stayed divided because a governor barely lost an
election should be nearly identical except on dimensions that are directly a↵ected by
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the election outcome. Focusing on these very close elections therefore allows me to
estimate the causal e↵ect of a change in full or split government partisan control, as
decided by the party of the governor.
Results
I first examine corporate investment sensitivity to changes in government full or split
partisan control. Controlling for investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q and cash flows),
demand (sales-growth), overall economic conditions (GDP growth and unemployment
rate) and partisan e↵ects (party of the incumbent or elected governor, incumbency
advantage, change in partisan majority among others), I find evidence of a persistent
negative relationship between switches from divided to unified government and in-
vestment. Specifically, corporate investment rate drops by an average of 2.5 percent
in the year following elections, when government switches from unified to divided.
I do not find supporting evidence of a symmetric positive response of investment
to reverse switches, from unified to divided government. The coe cient estimates
are even often negative, although they are not consistently statistically significant.
One explanation seems to be that ”switching” is a negative shock in itself. A switch
to unified government seems to exacerbate this negative e↵ect further. A switch to
divided government is associated with a positive, but not high enough, impact to turn
the net e↵ect into a rebound in the investment rate. Results are robust to varying
specifications to account for additional firm-level characteristics, state-level economic
variables and political controls.
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I do not find any evidence that the political platform of the incumbent or of the
newly-elected governor a↵ect corporate investment around the election cycle or the
investment sensitivity to the switch from divided (unified) to unified (divided) gov-
ernment.
The main caveat of this analysis is that, because the reach of state policy is local,
identifying firms or industries more exposed to their home state is critical to prop-
erly gauge the potential e↵ects and channels through which state policy may a↵ect
corporate decision making. Because Compustat firms are generally multi-state firms
their exposure to their headquarter states policy is lower than for single-state firms
and estimated coe cients are attenuated. To address this concern I estimate similar
regressions on a sub-sample of small firms, under the assumption that they are more
likely to be geographically concentrated in their home state. Results are stronger,
with a drop in the post-election year investment rate which is twice as large as the
average e↵ect.
More importantly, I extend my analysis to private sector firms. I exploit employment
data from the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics, which covers approx-
imately 98 percent of US private employment and removes any location bias that
could have been introduced by the use of the Compustat headquarter indicator. I
find a similar negative and significant drop in the job creation rate, following a switch
from divided to unified governments. The economic magnitude of the e↵ect is weaker
than for investment, and translates into a 1.5% decrease in the gross job creation
rate. This suggests a wait-and-see e↵ect since job destruction rate is also negatively
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a↵ected ( though the e↵ect is not consistently statistically significant) so that the net
creation rate remains basically unchanged. Younger firms and smaller firms, which
have one or two establishments, and for which we are thus almost certain that they
are entirely located in a given state, are found to be most a↵ected.
In the next set of results, the policy e↵ect is estimated from the discontinuity that
occurs when a gubernatorial candidate wins more than 50% of the votes so that the
party a liated with the Governor in the state legislature switches from being the
minority party to being the majority party. The RD estimates support the results
from the di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach, and show that giving a single party full
control over a state, by winning the governors election, systematically leads to a
significant drop in the investment rate of firms headquartered in that state in the
post-election year. The magnitude of the e↵ect translates into a 5-7 percent drop
when reported to the average investment rate. The results hold with and without
covariates and are robust to a placebo test in the year before the election outcomes
are known.
The policy uncertainty channel
Although the RD estimates establish that there is a negative e↵ect, they say little
about why this is the case. A potential channel that I will explore to explain these
results is the policy uncertainty channel. Government policy, including state level
policy, represents a large source of uncertainty for many firms. Firms do care about
which laws or regulation is likely to be passed and how it may impact their profits and
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operation capabilities (cf. examples of 10-Ks citations from the risk factors sections).
The topic has received a lot of interest lately with a growing literature looking at the
relation between policy uncertainty and corporate investment (Julio and Yook (2012);
Gulen and Ion (2015)) or asset prices (Kelly et al. (2016); Pástor and Veronesi (2013)).
While Democratic and Republican parties have di↵erent political agendas, the concept
of unified government is important in state lawmaking because the governor, the
senate and the house all play decisive roles in turning a partisan agenda into state
legislation. Election results partially resolve uncertainty related to future government
policies, but may not be very informative about the probability that a policy shift will
occur. It seems likely that whether a given party fully controls the government a↵ects
its ability to pass bills, and that this ability is higher when the elected government is
unified. 4 As American politics is polarized, unified governments are likely to yield
strong partisan outcomes in the form of more extreme economic policy choices. An
example of such choices can be found in the Kansas experiment under the unified
government of Republican governor Sam Brownback who enacted a major tax cut for
individuals and businesses.5
On the contrary, electing a divided government has been theorized as a way for voters
4A unified government is not a su cient condition for legislation to be passed, as another layer
of analysis (not yet taken into account in this draft) is the existence of supermajority rules in both
legislative bodies. Most states define a supermajority as either sixty percent or two-thirds of seats
held by a single party. Supermajority procedures and heterogeneous preferences make gridlock also
possible in a unified government.
5“With Brownback as governor, Kansas is in the midst of a self-described economic experiment,
a project that, whatever you think of its merits, is one of the boldest and most ambitious agendas
undertaken by any politician in America. Brownback calls it the march to zero, an attempt to wean
his states government o↵ the revenues of income taxes and to transition to a government that is
financed entirely by what he calls consumption taxes that is, sales taxes and, to a lesser extent,
property taxes.” New York Times, August 05 2015
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to get middle-ground policy through institutional balancing (Alesina and Rosenthal
(1996)). In addition, since passing legislation requires bipartisan support, policy
decisions enacted by a divided government are more likely to be durable and to survive
majority changes. Democratic Massachusetts governed by Republican William Weld
in the 1990s may be an illustration of a relatively smoothly run divided state.
In case no cooperative equilibrium is reached however, the default option is the statu
quo, often called gridlock. Under the gridlock theory, conflict between opposing
parties in a divided government increases the likelihood of stalemate in the policy-
making process (Binder (2003); Bowling and Ferguson (2001)). This assumption
echoes the literature on decision making in political system with veto players, which
suggests that the potential for policy change decreases as the number of groups with
institutional veto power increases (Tsebelis (1995)). An example of such political
gridlock is the struggle over the Minnesota budget between Democrat governor Mark
Dayton and the Republican controlled legislature which led to three weeks of state
government shutdown in 2011.
My identification assumption in this paper is that a switch from a divided to a unified
government raises policy uncertainty by ending the status quo regime and increasing
the probability of economic policy changes in general, and of more polarized changes
in particular. As a result policy uncertainty is assumed to be on average higher
in the post election year when government switches from divided to unified relative
to other post election outcomes. The main mechanism through which uncertainty
can a↵ect investment is through a real option e↵ect. If investment is irreversible,
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uncertainty increases the value of waiting for new information before investing in
a project. As a result uncertainty creates incentives to postpone investment.6 To
pin down the policy uncertainty channel I conduct several cross-sectional tests to see
whether firms that are ex-ante more sensitive to uncertainty have a larger response to
shocks induced by switches from divided to unified governments, and from unified to
divided governments. Using firm asset tangibility as well as the Kim and Kung (2014)
asset redeployability indicator, I find that, consistent with theoretical predictions,
the magnitude of the e↵ect is stronger for firms characterized by a higher degree of
investment irreversibility. I also test for the reverse pattern, that R&D investments
positively respond to increased uncertainty, that has been reported in the literature
(Atanassov et al. (2015)).7 I do not find any significant e↵ect for the average firm,
although the smallest firms have a significant 8 percent increase in R&D intensity in
the post-election year following a switch from divided to unified government. 8 The
time dynamics of the sensitivity of investment to switches from divided to unified
government shows that the e↵ect is entirely concentrated in the first year after a
governor is elected, which is consistent with the wait-and-see approach suggested
by the policy uncertainty channel. In the second and third year uncertainty about
government policies is more likely to have fallen, while some of the e↵ects of early
measures may already have materialized.
6Note that, as underlined by Julio and Yook (2012) the underlying mechanism does not neces-
sarily require an extreme policy outcome to be likely to create incentives to wait. Even a positive
change in policy, by reordering the ranking of the expected returns of mutually exclusive projects,
can a↵ect how the firm allocates its investment spending.
7They specifically find that electoral uncertainty before gubernatorial elections in the US encour-
ages firm-level R&D.
8The e↵ect adds up to the positive e↵ect documented by Atanassov et al. (2015) in the year before
the election. I confirm their e↵ect both for the average firm and in the small firms sub-sample.
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The findings are in line with cross-country evidence (Julio and Yook (2012)) that
the e↵ect of elections on investment cycles is larger for countries with fewer checks
and balances on executive authority. However, contrary to the papers that look into
investments short-term dynamics around election dates, I do not find evidence of
a pure timing e↵ect, as characterized by a drop and catch-up e↵ect. My analysis
suggests that the investment drop is temporary but is not counter-balanced by an
over-investment pattern in the remaining years of a gubernatorial term. The observed
decrease, though motivated by precautionary delay, seems to turn into a permanent
reduction in the conditional mean investment rate over a gubernatorial cycle.
This paper contributes to the debate on the real e↵ects of politics, and more specifi-
cally its e↵ect on firm performance and corporate decisions, and to our understanding
of the economic e↵ects of checks and balances. I document novel and robust evidence
that changes in full or split partisan control over a state government, within the same
political regime, induce cycles in corporate investment and employment. It suggests
that partisan alignment between executive and legislative powers may be as relevant
to explain corporate outcomes as partisan preferences over policy, through the channel
of policy uncertainty.
The paper also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of policy uncer-
tainty on the economy and in particular on the level and the timing of corporate
investment. Unlike the findings of the literature centered on short-term investment
dynamics around national elections (Julio and Yook (2012); Kelly et al. (2016)), I
find that the depressing e↵ect on investment attributable to state elections, though
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temporary, is not counterbalanced by a subsequent rebound. Instead, there seems to
be a permanent drop in the average corporate investment rate over a gubernatorial
cycle. These results highlight the interplay between political cycles and corporate
decisions, and the possibility that checks and balances directly influence corporate
decision-making.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the related
literature. Section 2 summarizes firm characteristics and the election data. Section 3
develops the empirical predictions and discusses the identification strategy. Section 4
presents the main empirical results related to corporate investment. Section 6 extends
the previous analysis to private firms by looking at corporate employment. Section 7
develops the estimation strategy using a Regression Discontinuity Design and section
8 explores the political uncertainty assumption as the underlying mechanism that
could explain the results.
1.2 Related literature
This paper relates to the finance literature on the impact of politics, and of policy
uncertainty, on firm outcomes and asset prices. It also contributes to the political
economy literature on the consequences of divided government.
How politics shape economic outcomes is a research question of long standing.
The earlier literature focuses on the impacts of politics on the macroeconomy (see
Drazen (2001) for a survey), showing strong supportive evidence of partisan business
cycles in the US with the economy performing better under Democrat than Repub-
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lican Presidents, in the first half of their terms (Alesina and Sachs (1988); Alesina
et al. (1997)). Empirical regularities of partisan cycles have also been robustly docu-
mented in the finance literature. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) find that average
excess returns in the US stock market are substantially higher under Democratic than
Republican presidencies. Nor business cycles neither the di↵erence in the riskiness of
the stock market explain this Presidential stock market puzzle.
More recently a micro based literature has explored which underlying channels could
explain a causal e↵ect of political cycles on financial markets and firm-level outcomes.
Firm dependence on government spending is one of these mechanisms. Cohen et al.
(2011) use changes in congressional committees chairmanship as a source of exoge-
nous variation in federal expenditures channeled to the US states. They find causal
evidence of a crowding out e↵ect on the private sector economy in states a↵ected
by positive fiscal spending shocks. Belo et al. (2013) show that, conditional on the
presidential partisan cycle, firm exposure to government spending predicts the cross
section of stock returns. Political connections through relationships or through cam-
paign contributions also explain heterogeneity in firms sensitivity to partisan cycles.
Announcements a↵ecting the degree of political connectedness of the firm are followed
by significant reactions in stock prices (Faccio (2006); Fisman (2001)). Cooper et al.
(2010) show that corporate contributions, in particular the number of candidates
supported by a firm, are positively correlated with future excess returns.
On the corporate side, and closely related to this paper, several recent studies have
investigated the e↵ect of policy uncertainty on firm investment using national elec-
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tion years, in a cross-country framework, as indicators of times of higher political
uncertainty. Julio and Yook (2012) document that firms cut investment by 4.8% in
election year relative to non-election years, on average, and that investment subse-
quently rebounds in the post-election year. A similar hold-on and catch-up dynamic
is found by Jens (2013) within the US, in the quarters preceding and following a
Governor election. Durnev (2010) shows that investment is less sensitive to stock
prices during election years. Atanassov et al. (2015) show that, contrary to capital
expenditures, government policy uncertainty encourages firm-level R&D. These pa-
pers focus on the dynamic of firm outcomes around the election date while previously
mentioned research investigates the relation between politics and finance through the
lens of partisanship. The role of institutions in general, and of checks and balances
in particular, has received less attention.
In line with the election literature, this paper uses the timing of US gubernatorial
elections as a source of plausibly exogenous political shocks. However it di↵ers in
that it focuses on firms response to particular outcomes of the election, reflecting the
extent to which a single party controls the government. While a few papers ana-
lyzed the impact of divided government on macro economic outcomes such as growth
and inflation (Alesina and Rosenthal (1989)), economic research on the consequences
of divided government has mainly focused on propensity to reform. Responding
to Mayhew’s “Divided We Govern” claim of an absence of policy stalemate in the
United-States (Mayhew (1991)), a subsequent body of empirical works suggests that
meaningful legislation is less likely to pass under divided than unified government
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(Binder (2003); Bowling and Ferguson (2001); Coleman (1999); Howell et al. (2000)).
Coleman (1999) and Howell et al. (2000) find evidence supporting the conjecture that,
in the US, unified government is much more productive as regards the quantity of
important legislative enactments. Consistent with the gridlock hypothesis, Bowling
and Ferguson (2001) find that when a governor faced a legislature controlled by the
opposition party, divided government did make passage of conflictual policy more
di cult. Andersen et al. (2012) find that the budget is 10 to 20% more likely to
be late under divided government. The analysis of the economic impact of divided
vs. unified governments on corporate policy decisions, at the firm level, has not been
explored to the best of my knowledge.
1.3 Data description
1.3.1 Election data
This study considers 408 gubernatorial elections conducted in 46 states in the United
States, between 1978 and 2010. It spans up to 8 gubernatorial elections in each state.
There are 403 regular gubernatorial elections, whose timing is exogenous. Three
special elections are also included. Removing them does not change the results.9
The primary source for the US gubernatorial election data is the CQ Press Electronic
Library. Election results from 1978 to 2000 have been obtained from List and Sturm
9The 2003 California gubernatorial recall election was a special election permitted under Cali-
fornia state law. It resulted in voters replacing the incumbent Democratic Governor Gray Davis
with Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger. The 2010 Utah special election was conducted to fill the
remainder of Jon Huntsmans term who resigned in 2009 to become the United States Ambassador
to China. The 2011 West Virginia special gubernatorial election was conducted after Governor Joe
Manchin resigned in 2010 to run for the US Senate, following Senator Robert Byrds death in 2010.
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(2006), available at: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/sturmd/. Data from 2000 to 2010 have
been updated using figures from the Congressional Quarterly database. The data on
party control of state governments and legislatures have been obtained from Klarners
dataset on Partisan Balance of State governments, available at http://klarnerpolitics.com/data-
sets/ . The final data includes the election date, the winning governor candidate and
her party, whether the incumbent governor participates in the election, the vote mar-
gin in the gubernatorial election, the party holding the Senate or the House.
Currently 48 states have four-year terms for their governors. States that have a two-
year terms are Vermont and New Hampshire. Arkansas before 1986 and Rhode Island
before 1994 also did. They are excluded from my sample so as to compare states with
the same political cycle length. Though the four-year length of a governor term is
the same, states hold their elections in a staggered way. Thirty-four 10states hold
their gubernatorial elections in even numbered years which are not concurrent with
Presidential elections, nine states hold their gubernatorial elections in the same year
as presidential elections.11
Three states hold their gubernatorial elections in the year before the Presidential
election (Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi) and two (New Jersey and Virginia)
hold them in the year after. With the exception of Louisiana, gubernatorial elections
always take place on the first Tuesday in November. 12
10Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
11Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and
West Virginia
12Louisiana is an exception with respect to election dates that can be di↵erent because of the open
primary system applied to gubernatorial elections.
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Like the federal government, each state government is made of a legislative and an
executive branch. State legislatures, divided into a lower and an upper chamber, have
members elected by voters every two to four years. I am not considering mid-term
legislature elections in this study. Since I am interested in the partisan control of state
governments, I exclude Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature of members with
no party a liations. I also drop elections in which one of the top two candidates is
an independent. 13
Party control of state government can exist in various configurations. A government
is divided if at least the majority in one of the legislative chambers is from a di↵erent
party than the governors party. Divided government can occur in a split branch
form, when the legislature is Unified against the executive, as it is the case for the
US Congress at the national level since Republicans have regained a majority in
the Senate after 2014 mid-term elections. divided government may also mean that
the legislature is itself divided (so called split legislature) as it was the case at the
federal level, right before the 2014 mid-terms, with Republicans holding the House
and Democrats the Senate.
As illustrated by figures 1.1 and 1.3, at the state level, over the 33 years of the sample
period, swings from divided to unified government are the norm and not the exception.
Half of the states have been divided on average over the period studied, with 212
gubernatorial elections held between 1978 and 2010 electing a divided government.
In 60% of these elections a Republican governor was elected.
13This includes Minnesota (1999-2003); Maine(1995-2003); Connecticut (1991-1995) and Alaska
(1990-1994).
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[ insert Figure 1.1 here ]
[ insert Figure 1.3 here ]
Panel A of table 1 summarizes the election data in more details. 20% of the guber-
natorial elections considered in this study resulted in a change from a divided to a
unified government while 16% led to the reverse switch. More than 80% of elections,
which resulted in a switch (“divided to unified” or “unified to divided”), also elected
a non-incumbent governor. 9% of gubernatorial elections led to a switch from a di-
vided state ruled by a Republican governor to a Democratic unified state. 6% of
gubernatorial elections led to a switch from a divided government under a Democrat
governorship to a Republican unified government. Changes in partisan alignment
following gubernatorial elections, switches from divided to unified or from unified to
divided, have been frequent and quite evenly distributed over the election cycle (cf.
figure 1.2 ).
[ insert Table 1.1 here ]
[ insert Figure 1.2 here ]
Finally, as shown on the political maps (figures 1.4 and 1.5), changes in party unified
or divided control over a state government are geographically widespread. All states
but Georgia, Kentucky, Montana and the state of New York have at least experi-
enced one change from divided to unified following a gubernatorial election (i.e. not
including mid-term election changes).
[ insert Figure 1.4 here ]
[ insert Figure 1.5 here ]
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The US case is not an exception and many Western democracies have checks and
balances. In France, for instance, the term “cohabitation” is used to describe situa-
tions in which power is split between a President from one party and a parliament
held by the opposition.14 In parliamentary democracies like Germany it is also fre-
quent that the Bundestag (consisting of members of state governments) has a di↵erent
party majority than the Bundesrat (the parliament electing the federal government).
Since most important laws need a majority in both chambers, legislative deadlock
can possibly arise.
1.3.2 State-level data
I obtain state macroeconomic data from various sources. State finance data (bud-
get surplus, public debt and taxes revenues) are from Klarner’s State Economic
Database, with original data coming from the Historical Database of State Gov-
ernment Finances which is maintained by the US Census of Governments. State-level
real GDP growth and unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(http://sdata.bls.gov).
In the last section I shift the focus of my analysis to corporate employment. I exploit
the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS), produced by the US Cen-
sus Bureau, which is publicly available and reports semi-aggregated statistics from
the Business Register. BDS data contains annual observations on employment for
establishments in the private sector and covers approximately 98 percent of US pri-
14Implications are likely to be di↵erent from the US case though, because the President has to
appoint a prime minister of the opposing party, resulting in a split in the executive but not the
legislative power.
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vate employment. Information is available at the establishment-level on employment
stocks and job flows, for continuing, entering, and exiting establishments. The unit of
observation is the establishment defined as the single physical location where business
is conducted. 15
Establishment data is broken down by location (state) of the establishment, and
within state by size and by age of the parent firms. 16
Panel B of table 1.2 describes gross and net job flows from 1978 to 2010. The average
job creation rate at the establishment level over the sample period is 17.6% and
the average destruction rate is 15.3%, leading to a net job creation of 2.3%. While
employment in terms of number of employees is highly concentrated in large firms17,
both creation and destruction rates are skewed towards smaller firms (less than 250
employees) and younger firms (5 year or less) which experiment a gross creation rate
around 20%, 7 percentage points higher than for larger and older ones.
1.3.3 Firm-level data
The firm-level sample consists of US publicly listed companies. Data are from the
merged CRSP/COMPUSTAT Fundamentals Annual database. Panel A of table ta-
ble 1.2 reports summary statistics for the firm economics characteristics used in the
analysis.
[ insert Table 1.2 here ]
15An establishment is a fixed physical location where economic activity occurs. Firm level data
are compiled based on an aggregation of establishments under common ownership by a corporate
parent.
16Job creations come from either opening establishments or expanding establishments and job
destructions from either closing establishments or contracting establishments.
17Large firms, with 500 or more employees employ about 50 percent of all workers.
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The sample period extends from January 1978 to December 2010. While keeping
firms whose headquarters are located in the United States, I filter out observations of
firms that were headquartered in Nebraska, because it has a unicameral legislature, as
well as those headquartered in New Hampshire, Vermont, Arkansas before 1986 and
Rhode Island before 1994 since those states have a 2-year gubernatorial election cycle.
Firms headquartered in the District of Columbia and in Hawaii are also discarded.
I exclude financials (SIC between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC between 4900 and
4999) because their cash holdings and investment policy may respond to regulatory
supervision. I exclude firm-year observations for which information on capital expen-
ditures, net property, plant and equipment, sales, and total assets is not available.
Total assets must be available in t and t-1. Moreover, I exclude observations with
negative assets, capital expenditures, share outstanding and stock prices, as well as
observations with capital expenditures larger than total assets. Finally, I winsorize
all ratios at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the e↵ect of outliers.This leaves an
unbalanced panel of 9,558 unique firms over 33 years for a total of 91,202 firm-year
observations (though the need to lag certain variables, data availability of additional
covariates, as well as gaps in the panel structure of some firms will reduce the sample
size used in some of the regressions).
Investment is Capital Expenditures scaled by beginning of fiscal year net Property,
Plant and Equipment.18 The mean (median) firm has an investment ratio of .27 (.22).
I use the Tobin’s Q investment specification, augmented by controls for firms’ char-
18This normalization by PP&E is standard in the investment literature (see, e.g., Kaplan and
Zingales 1997 or Almeida et al. 2007). My results are robust to an alternative normalization choice
by lagged asset value, which yields lower coe cient estimates. Cf. table 1.21 : Robustness to
alternative definitions of the investment rate.
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acteristics and economic conditions. Given the lack of a suitable empirical measure
of marginal q, I use the common measure of book-to-market ratio as a measure for
average Tobin’s Q to proxy for growth opportunities in business conditions.19 Cash
flows are Net Income before Extraordinary Items plus Depreciation scaled by lagged
asset value. Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Sales
growth is measured as the log di↵erence in annual sales. Finally I use Research and
development expenses as reported in Compustat (xrd) as a measure of R&D, for firms
with non missing values. The average firm in the sample has a Q of 1.7, total assets
of 1.6 billion, a leverage ratio of 24%, a profitability (ROE) of 2%, a tangibility of
33%, sales growth of 7% and a R&D intensity ratio of 7.3%.
1.3.4 Location data issue
I assign firms to their geographic location based on headquarter address information,
which I initially extract from Compustat. One concern with Compustat location
data is that it reports a firm’s current not its historic headquarter location. And
firms may have changed headquarters location. Though, Pirinsky and Wang (2006)
show that in the period 1992-1997, less than 3% of firms in Compustat changed their
headquarter locations, Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) estimate that for the period
1989-2011 overall Compustat’s location data are incorrect for 10% o↵ firms. I cannot
19Market Equity is price times shares outstanding. Price is from CRSP, shares outstanding are
from Compustat (if available) or CRSP. Book Equity is the book value of stockholders’ equity,
plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), minus the book value of
preferred stock. Depending on availability, I use the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in that
order) to estimate the book value of preferred stock. Stockholders’ equity is the value reported in
Compustat, if it is available. If not, I measure stockholders’ equity as the book value of common
equity plus the par value of preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus total liabilities (in
that order).
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correct for measurement error with firms changing headquarters location. It will lead
to an attenuation bias pushing downwards the “true” estimate. So any significant
estimated e↵ect should be interpreted as a lower bound.
Another concern is that a firm’s corporate headquarters may be in one state while its
plants and operations are located in other states. Similarly firm clients and suppliers
need not be concentrated around the headquarters. As a result geographically diver-
sified firms are less likely to be sensitive to local political shocks, which will attenuate
again the magnitude of my estimates. For example, Whole Foods Market is head-
quartered in Austin, Texas, but has a large number of stores and significant exposure
in other states. The e↵ect is likely to be meaningful since, using Garćıa and Norli
(2012) textual analysis based data measuring firm geographical exposure, I estimate
that roughly 18% of firms are geographically diversified at the state level over the
period 1993-2008. 20 Limiting the sample period to 1993-2008 and to firms that are
geographically focused in their headquarter state based on their measure does not
yield, however, any meaningful results.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 Model and Identification Assumptions
My baseline empirical model to examine the e↵ect of changes in states’ government di-
vided unified partisan control on firms’ investment decisions is a Q-investment model.
20Under the assumption that mentions of US states in a firm’s annual report identify locations
where the firm has meaningful economic interests, they measure firms geographical dispersion with
the number of unique states cited in their 10-K.The percentage of firms that are headquartered in
state A but mentioned state B more than 50% of time in their 10-K is on average 18% over the
period 1993-2008.
24
The model, defined in equation (1.1) below, is a standard in the financial literature
and has been used in previous research looking at the impact of policy uncertainty
on corporate investment thus providing a benchmark for my results (Julio and Yook
(2012); Durnev (2010)).
In the next section, I will consider two other specifications for estimating the e↵ect
of the change in the unified or divided party control of a state government on invest-
ment: a Regression Discontinuity Design (RD) specification with a flexible control






+  0Elections,t +  1PostElections,t
+ 2PostElections,t⇤DUs,t+ 3PostElections,t⇤UDs,t+ 1TobinQi,s,t 1+ 2CFi,s,t (1.1)
+ 3Salei,s,t 1 +  4Sizei,s,t 1 +   GSPs,t 1 + c0Republicans,t +RegionR,t + ✏i,s,t
Where i indexes firm, s indexes state, R indexes Census regions and t denotes time.
The dependent variable is a measure of corporate investment in year t, which is the
ratio of capital expenditures in that year scaled by lagged fixed assets (property,
plant, and equipment). ↵
i
is a firm fixed e↵ect, Region
Rt
is a Census region x year
fixed e↵ect, and ✏
ist
is a random error term assumed to be correlated within firm
observations in a given state, as well as across firms observations and potentially
heteroskedastic (Petersen (2009)).
My main variables of interest are dummy variables equal to one for firm i, head-
quartered in state j in year t, if state j government divided/unified partisan control
changes following a gubernatorial election in t   1, and zero otherwise. Changes in
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partisan control occurring after mid-term elections are not considered in this study.
Specifically the “Switch to divided” dummy, DU
st
, is set to one in the post election
year t, when government was unified in year t  1 and switches to divided as a result
of the gubernatorial election held in t  1. The “switch to unified” dummy, UD
st
, is
set to one in the post election year t, when government was divided in year t  1 and
switches to unified as a result of the gubernatorial election held in t  1.
The parameters of interest are  2 and  3, which respectively capture changes in
the conditional investment rate in the period following gubernatorial elections, after
government switched from divided (unified) to unified (divided), controlling for firm
investment opportunities and state economic conditions. Because of the inclusion of
a firm specific e↵ect, identification of  2 and  3 comes only from those firms that
experience the regime shift. 21
Following Julio and Yook (2012), I define the post-election year so that the post-
election dummy variable takes a value of one for any firm-year in which an election is
held no later than two months after the fiscal year beginning of year t and no earlier
than 10 months before the fiscal year beginning of year t.22 The post-election dummy
variable requires that approximately 80% or more of a firm’s fiscal-year days fall after
the election date. All fiscal years for which the election date does not fall within this
range have the election dummy set to a value of zero.23 See 1.6 for a description of
21Therefore, restricting our attention to the sub-sample of firms that experience at least one such
change in the Regression Discontinuity Design should yield qualitatively similar results.
22My results are robust to various cut-o↵ points but the magnitude of the e↵ect is lower for longer
overlap periods
23As fiscal year ends are mostly concentrated in June and December, it means that for a guber-
natorial election held in November of year t, fiscal year t+1 is considered the post election year for
firm A whose fiscal year end is December, while fiscal year t+2 will be the post-election year for
firm B whose fiscal year end is June.
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the matching between election years and fiscal years.
[ insert Table 1.6 here ]
The baseline regression includes control variables known to a↵ect investment deci-
sions. I control for various measures of time-varying firm characteristics and state
economic conditions, as well as for regional time trends. Firm specific variables in-
clude Tobin’s Q, as an empirical proxy for marginal q, sales growth, firm size (log
of firm’s total assets value) measured at the end of previous fiscal year, as well as
current operating cash flows (CF). I also incorporate controls for the e↵ect of state
economic circumstances. As state level economic indicators I include the one-year
lagged growth rate of state GDP as well as the change in the state’s unemployment
rate. I include firm-fixed e↵ects to capture invariant state institutions and unobserved
firm characteristics. Because di↵erent regions of the country may face heterogeneous
economic shocks, I control for region-level trends by allowing the time fixed e↵ects to
vary across Census Regions. My time e↵ect thus contains aggregate shocks, including
for example changes in federal economic policies and conditions a↵ecting all states in
similar ways, as well as shocks that are specific to one geographic region.
To take account of serial correlation over time, within and between firms, within
a state, standard errors are clustered at the state level. As a robustness, I also
cluster by time to capture the unspecified correlation between observations on firms
from di↵erent states in the same year (Petersen (2009); Cameron et al. (2008)). The
results are basically unchanged. However given the number of time periods is only
33 years this specification is not the preferred one.
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To facilitate the comparison of economic magnitudes across covariates, all variables
have been normalized by their sample standard deviation prior to running the regres-
sion. Each coe cient can thus be interpreted as the change in the investment rate
variable (as a proportion of its standard deviation) associated with a one standard
deviation increase in right hand side variables.
The key identifying assumption is that conditional on firm-level and state-level co-
variates and on region x year fixed e↵ects, treated and control firms share parallel
trends in the absence of a partisan control regime change. Under the identification
assumptions that the state of headquarter is a relevant and well-measured indicator of
firms’ geographic exposure, that no important observed or unobserved variable (that
varies within states across time, while being systematically correlated with switches
and having an influence on investment stopping at the state border) has been omitted,
and that voter choice is exogenous to expected economic conditions (so that divided
states that switch to unified and divided states that stay divided do not systemati-
cally di↵er), then the estimates derived from the OLS specifications will accurately
reflect the causal e↵ect of policy choices.
For several reasons the OLS will only be an approximation, a lower bound plausibly,
of the ATE. First the parallel trend assumption at the state level is unlikely to hold
perfectly, given the di↵erences that do exist between states in the US, and the fact that
I am not comparing states starting in the exact same partisan phase of their political
cycle before some switch and others do not. In addition given the location caveats
that has already been mentioned, my estimate will likely be attenuated. Finally I
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cannot totally rule out the possibility of an omitted variable bias, though for the
results to be driven by confounders, one would have to believe that switches from
divided to unified government were systematically correlated with unobserved within
Census region shocks, common to states switching at the same point in time, but not
to other states in that region, and that these shocks are not reflected in measures of
state-specific business cycles and firm-specific measures of investment opportunities
(first moment e↵ects).
To gain confidence in the robustness of the e↵ect, I carry out several robusteness
checks, adding more controls for a wide range of state macro economic conditions
and political variables, firm observed characteristics as well as varying the definition
of the investment rate (endogenous variable). To approach the causality of the e↵ect
better, I use a Regression Discontinuity Design to re-estimate my regression in the
next section.
1.4.2 Main Results
Sensitivity to switches from divided to unified
Table 2 reports the baseline regression results. A switch from divided to unified
government is associated with a lower investment rate in the post election year. The
reduction in the conditional investment rate in the year after the election that gives
a single party control of the executive and legislative branches of a state government
is economically meaningful and statistically significant. Decrease in the conditional
investment rate for a firm in a treated state ranges between 2.5 percent and 3.7
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percent relative to the average investment rate in states that do not switch to a
unified government. A switch from a unified to a divided government is not found to
have a significant e↵ect on the conditional mean investment rate.
[ insert Table 1.3 here ]
I start with a very parsimonious specification and then add control variables in order
to examine whether the negative and significant point estimate for the switch from
divided to unified remains robust. The coe cient remains negative and significant in
all specifications. The first column reports the results of the regression of investment
on the post election and the “Switch to unified” dummies alone, controlling for year
fixed e↵ects.
The average e↵ect is -0.01 percentage point. As some firms invest more than others
and states also di↵er in the investment incentives they provide to firms, I incor-
porate firm fixed e↵ects in column 2 to control for unobserved firm and state-level
heterogeneity. The results are thus driven by within-firms variations. I also include
region-by-year dummy variables to account for potential regional shocks to invest-
ment. The results are robust to the inclusion of such e↵ects. Column 4 adds the
dummy for the reverse switch of going from unified to divided and column 5 controls
for investment sensitivity in the pre-election period.24 Contrary to the literature on
political uncertainty around election dates I do not find any negative e↵ect in the
pre-election year for gubernatorial elections, looking at an annual frequency. It is
24The pre-election dummy, which is added in (5), takes a value of one if the election date lies
between 2 month prior to the end of the fiscal year t and 10 months after the end of fiscal year t.
All fiscal years for which the election date does not fall within this range have the election dummy
set to a value of zero.
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likely the case that Presidential elections have wider implications than gubernatorial
elections, specially for large public listed firm. If the e↵ect is really subdued and
temporary looking at yearly data may not be high enough a frequency to capture
uncertainty e↵ects around gubernatorial elections. Additionally because of the local
reach of state-level policy only firms with high exposure to their state are likely to be
a↵ected. As a robustness in the last paragraph of this section I estimate the e↵ect of
the pre-election year on a sub-sample of small firms. In this case I find results in line
with the election/investment literature (Julio and Yook (2012)).
One potential concern is that the first moment of investment opportunities may drive
the investment drops as opposed as the second moment. This concern is particularly
relevant given a growing body of research suggesting that uncertainty is counter-
cyclical (e.g. Bloom (2009)). To address this issue, I introduce standard firm-level
covariates of investment (i.e. lagged Tobin Q, cash flows, lagged percentage change in
sales and lagged size) that could cause investment rate to diverge for reasons unrelated
to the changes in political control of government (column 6). Next I control for local
business cycle that can explain di↵erent investment patterns accross states within
the same region, by adding the lagged change in state real GDP (column 7). Adding
such controls has virtually weak e↵ect on the estimated investment sensitivity to
switches from divided to unified governments. This implies that the political shocks
do not coincide systematically with changes in firm-level characteristics or state-level
economic conditions.
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To investigate whether the results are indeed due to changes in political control align-
ment rather than to policy di↵erences between the Democratic and Republican Party,
I use an indicator variable for the elected governor’s party a liation. The party
dummy is set to one when the newly elected governor is a Republican and zero other-
wise. Extensive political controls confirm the robusteness of the e↵ect (See Appendix
1 Tables 1.17,1.18,1.19).
Specifications 7 and 8 are the same but for the clustering of standard errors. In
the first case, I cluster standard errors at the state level only, to capture within state
cross-sectional correlation. This is a concern, because firms headquartered in the same
state are a↵ected by the same political shock, namely, the change from a divided to a
unified government. In specification 8, I also cluster by time to capture the unspecified
correlation between observations on firms from di↵erent states in the same year. The
double clustered standard errors are larger than the standard errors clustered by just
state, indicating that there is correlation of the residuals within a year. However given
I only have 33 time periods and since the results are basically unchanged, I choose
a simple firm-clustering specification as my baseline specification.25 There may be
some concern that the auto-correlation in capital expenditures may contribute to the
political cycles documented in this paper. The main finding is robust to the inclusion
of lagged investment rates (column 9). Finally, to verify that my results are not
capturing a Presidential election e↵ect, I run the baseline specification excluding the
25I have 33 years (time clusters) and 46 states (state clusters) in most of the specifications. Since
the clustered standard error places no restriction on the correlation structure of the residuals within a
cluster, its consistency depends on having a su cient number of clusters. This approach is unbiased
as long as there are a su cient number of clusters, in this case both enough states and enough time
periods.
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nine states in which governor elections are concurrent with presidential elections.26
The coe cient on the switch to unified dummy is higher (-0.001) and significant at
the 1% level.
[ insert Table 1.4 here ]
Sensitivity to switches from unified to divided
As mentioned before, going from a unified to a divided government is not found to
have a significant e↵ect on the conditional mean investment rate. I can see three
explanations that could potentially account for the lack of response to switches from
unified to divided governments.
1. First, any change in partisan control regime (i.e. from divided to unified AND
from unified to divided) could be a source of uncertainty having in itself a
negative e↵ect. While a switch to a unified government may exacerbate this
e↵ect, a switch to a divided government may counterbalance it, though not
enough to turn it into a rebound in the investment rate. Results presented in
table 1.4 explores this possibility and corroborate my assumption. In column 2
I include both a switch dummy which takes a value of 1 after a divided state
elects a unified government and after a unified state elects a divided government
as well as a specific dummy for the switch from unified to divided. The latest
shows up with a positive and significant coe cient of 0.007, not strong enough
though to counterbalance the negative switch e↵ect of -0.008.
26Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and
West Virginia
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2. Another possibility is that the magnitude of the e↵ect of a change in partisan
alignment control may not be symmetric, depending which way we go. If the
first year of a unified government yields more policy ”surprises” than the first
term of a divided government, then asymmetry is consistent with rational ex-
pectations and Pástor and Veronesi (2013) model in which expected policies do
not move the market but unexpected do.
3. Finally, the lower significance of the e↵ect of a switch to divided government
may be a power issue since the number of “reverse switches” is lower than the
number of switches to unified government in the sample.
1.4.3 The response of investment over time
The primary focus to this point has been on whether firms reduce investment in the
year following a gubernatorial election outcome. I now turn to the dynamics of invest-
ment around a full gubernatorial term. To address this question, I construct dummy
variables based on lead and lags of my variable of interest (i.e. the “T1*Switch”
dummy). I then include these dummy variables in the investment baseline specifica-
tion to provide a more detailed estimation of the pattern of investment over the four
years of a gubernatorial cycle. The estimation results are reported in Table 1.5 and
illustrated in figure 1.7. The analysis enables to investigate whether there is any pre
trend in investment that would di↵er significantly between treated and control firms
and could indicate that firms anticipated the change in partisan control of the state
government. In absence of pre trends, in T=0, when neither the results of the elec-
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tion nor its e↵ective outcome are realized, we should not see any significant impact
on investment. Reassuringly the T0 coe cient T0 ⇤ 1SwitchToUnified is not statistically
di↵erent from zero. Firms react after the election outcome is fully observed.
[ insert Table 1.5 here ]
[ insert Figure 1.7 here ]
A natural question is how persistent is the e↵ect associated with switching to a unified
government. If, as suggested in the last part of this paper, a change to a unified
government translates into higher policy uncertainty then we should expect the e↵ect
to be temporary. Typically in the following years as economic agents have started to
learn about government policy choices and about their impact on the economy the
e↵ect should lower. As uncertainty is not fully resolved we may not observe a full
reversal though.
The results are consistent with this predictions as coe cients estimates for years
T=+2 and T=+3 are non statistically di↵erent from zero. However the absence of
any o↵-setting rebound in the investment rate suggests that the shift from a divided
to a unified government leads to a permanent e↵ect and not a temporal re-allocation
of investment around the gubernatorial cycle. It could be that investment starts to
increase only gradually or too slowly to capture the e↵ect over my estimation window,
which is limited to two years after the switch as another gubernatorial cycle starts
after that.
Another explanation is that mid-term elections in year T=2 can change the split vs.
full control of a party over the government so that it attenuates my estimates.
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Finally a joint test on my four coe cient of interest to test that they are equal to
zero yields a p-value of 0.1051. Though I cannot reject the null hypothesis of a pure
reallocation e↵ect, it is very close to the 10% cut-o↵. The same test in di↵erent sub-
samples explored later in the analysis (small firms, high PP&E ratio) of firms ex-ante
more likely to respond to the shock rejects the null.
It would also have been worrisome if the baseline for investment was negative across
a unified government term as it could suggest that those states that switched to
unified were those for which divided government was associated with a poor economic
performance. This is not the case. This suggests that the negative relationship
is not driven by a shift in partisan alignment control of government responding to
deteriorating economic conditions.
1.4.4 Robustness
In this section, I perform several robustness checks.
Additional State-level controls
First, I estimate the regressions omitting the two final years of the sample period,
2009 and 2010, as there is some concern that the financial crisis itself could be driving
the results. The results remain intact. Next, I add further state-level macro controls
in my base specification to ensure that state government unified or divided control
changes are not triggered by other observed factors that in turn cause firms to adjust
their investment rate for reasons unrelated to the change in regime itself. For example,
unified government may be more likely to be elected when the state runs a budget
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deficit as they have been shown to be able to react and adjust more e ciently.
Table 1.16 in Appendix 1 reports that the results are robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional state-level macro variables, such as lagged changes in state unemployment rate,
in state budget surplus, state debt outstanding and state tax revenue, as a percentage
of GSP. The e↵ect of lagged changes in state unemployment rates is negative, consis-
tent with firms investing less when economic conditions in their home state worsen
but not statistically significant as it is collinear with the lagged growth in state gdp.
Conditioning on including growth in state gdp as a control only budget surplus and
the total debt outstanding reported to gdp have significant additional explanatory
power on the investment rate, likely channelling to firms exposed to public spending.
Across all these specification the e↵ect of a switch to a unified government remains
significant an its magnitude is almost unchanged.
Tables 1.17, 1.18 and 1.19 report estimation results for further political robustness
controls. Column 1 and 2 report the estimates from the inclusion of a dummy which
is set equal to one when government is divided before the election and stays divided
as a result of the election. Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates from the inclusion
of a dummy which is set equal to one when government is unified before the election
and stays unified as a result of the election. Staying unified or staying divided has no
e↵ect on the investment rate and both dummies are positive. As mentioned previously
it seems that this is the change from one regime (divided) to another (unified) that
matters. Column 5 and 6 look at the e↵ect of a change in the party of the elected
governor. Columns 7 to 9 add a ”non-incumbent” dummy variable and its interactions
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with our treatment variables.
The non incumbent dummy is set to 1 when the elected governor has not served in
the past. The assumption is that the election of an incumbent governor should lead
to lower uncertainty as firms have prior knowledge of the governor achievements and
capabilities as well as of his ability to work with the Legislature. Surprisingly, I find
no evidence of variation in the post-election investment rate depending on whether
an incumbent or a new governor is elected. Table 1.18 presents estimation results
controlling for the party of the elected governor and excluding Southern states.27
I control for the partisanship of the elected governor by interacting the party of the
governor with the post-election year indicator variable as well as with the indicators
of a change to divided or to unified. The results are unchanged.
In table 1.19, I investigate whether the political platform of the incumbent governor
a↵ects the investment sensitivity to the switch from divided (unified) to unified (di-
vided) government. For example, if we assume that Republican governors may be
more business-friendly, then the election outcome might be di↵erent from the firm’s
perspective, if the state is unified under a Republican legislature or a Democrat one;
similarly the e↵ect of going from unified to divided could be di↵erent given the party
of the incumbent governor. To the extent that right-leaning governors are more
market-friendly, we expect that firms view a transition from republican-to-divided as
having more potentially bad news than a possible democrat-to-divided transition of
power. I control for the partisanship of the incumbent governor by interacting the
27South is defined as the 16 states that make the Census South region : DE, FL, GE, MD, NC,
SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, TX
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party of the leaving governor with the post-election year indicator variable as well as
with the indicators of a change to divided or to unified. The governor party dummy
is set to one for Democrat governors and zero otherwise. The results are una↵ected.
Weak partisan e↵ects are consistent with a second moment e↵ect or uncertainty chan-
nel and not with a first moment channel tied to policy preferences under Democrats
or Republicans. This absence of partisan e↵ect is not surprising given the fact that
previous literature results (Besley and Case (1995)) show weak evidence for the in-
fluence of the individual partisanship of the governor on various economic outcomes
including tax and spending policies.
Additional firm-level controls, investment definitions and treatment year
definitions
For additional robustness, I estimate the regression equation including additional
firm-level control variables such as leverage, asset tangibility, cash holdings and age.
Table 1.20 in Appendix 1 shows that all these covariates have significant explanatory
power but they do not a↵ect the results for our variables of interest. In table 1.21 I
use di↵erent definitions of the investment rate, scaling capital expenditures by total
assets, using the growth rate in the absolute amount of capital expenditures or the
first di↵erence in the investment rate.
The switch from a divided to a unified government is still associated with a negative
and significant e↵ect on the left hand side investment variable. Finally, in table 1.22,
I check that the results are not sensitive to the definition of the post-election year i.e.
39
to the matching process between fiscal data and election data.
The main specification uses the same definition as in Julio and Yook (2012) which
requires the post-election year dummy variable to take a value of one for any firm-year
in which an election is held no later than two months after the beginning of the firm
fiscal year. I test for di↵erent cut-o↵s, 1 month, 3 months and 4 months. My results
are robust, the magnitude of the e↵ect being slightly lower for longer overlap periods.
Overall results are robust to varying specifications to account for additional firm-level
characteristics, state-level economic variables and political controls. The main caveat
of this analysis remains that, because the reach of state policy is local, identifying
firms or industries more exposed to their home state is critical to properly gauge
the e↵ects and channels through which state policy may a↵ect corporate decision
making. Because Compustat firms are generally multi-state firms their exposure to
their headquarter state’s policy is lower than for single-state firms and estimated
coe cients should be interpreted as an attenuated e↵ect.
To address this concern in the next section I first restrict my sample to a sub-sample
of small firms, under the assumption that they are more likely to be geographically
concentrated in their home state. More importantly, I then extend my analysis to
private sector firms. I exploit employment data from the Census Bureau’s Business
Dynamics Statistics, which covers approximately 98 percent of US private employ-
ment and removes any location bias that could have been introduced by the use of
the Compustat headquarter indicator.
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1.5 State exposure : Small firms and Employment evidence
1.5.1 Small firms analysis
Table 1.6 presents results obtained by running the baseline investment specification
on five sub-samples of the population based on firm size. In column 1 the model is
estimated for the smallest firm, defined as firms in the bottom quintile of the total
assets distribution over the full sample period so that the sub-sample composition is
not changing over time except by entry and exit dynamic. Concerns that those firms
have other unobserved characteristics that may have prevented them to grow further
over the sample period are alleviated by the presence of firm fixed e↵ects.
[ insert Table 1.6 here ]
The smallest ones are more likely to have operations concentrated in their home state
and hence to be more sensitive to state political cycles. In line with this assumption,
results are stronger, with a drop in the post-election year investment rate which is
twice as large as the average e↵ect, for the first quintile sub-sample.
In this specific sub-sample, I find a significant drop and rebound in the investment
rate, around the election date, which is consistent with the empirical literature find-
ings (Julio and Yook (2012)) on policy uncertainty and investment cycles. Interest-
ingly the magnitude of the e↵ect associated with a transition from a divided to a
unified government in the pot election year is about three times larger as the pre-
election uncertainty e↵ect on which the literature has focused.
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1.5.2 Private sector employment analysis
This section consists in an extension to corporate employment decisions of private
firms. As employment can be seen as investment in new workers, partly irreversible
because of the costs of hiring, training and firing, jobs creation and destruction should
exhibit similar patterns as investment.
Empirical strategy
I exploit data from the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics, which covers
approximately 98 percent of US private employment. Using Compustat would have
the double disadvantage of the location issue previously discussed and a limited cov-
erage as it represents only about one-third of employment in the United States (Davis
and Haltiwanger (1992)). BDS data contains annual observations on employment for
all establishments in the private sector, covering 1978–2010.2829
I follow the same empirical strategy as for investment.
I successively look at job creation rate, job destruction rate and net job creation
rate as dependent variables. For each state, job creation (destruction) rate is the
ratio of the sum of all employment gains (losses) from establishments located in that
state, from year t–1 to year t, including establishment startups (deaths), divided
by average of state employment for times t and t-1. All growth rates are based on
28I start my analysis in 1978 as in the investment case but results are robust to starting in 1979
because of anomalies in the BDS data that have been pointed out by previous researchers (Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2012)).
29An establishment is a fixed physical location where economic activity occurs. Firm level data
are compiled based on an aggregation of establishments under common ownership by a corporate
parent.
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March–to–March changes and the tabulations for a given year are the changes from
the prior year to the current year.
Job creation (destruction) rate is matched to elections based on the location of the
establishment. A gubernatorial election occurring on November of year t is matched
with changes in employment from March t to March t+1 and the post-election year
is matched with changes in employment from March t+1 to March t+2.
Following the literature, I control for state population (natural log of state population)
as range in population between states and across time is large and for real gross state
product per capita. After controlling for state population, this term can be thought
of as a rough proxy for average employee productivity. I also control for the size of
the parent firm since smaller firms account for most of the job creations. I use initial
firm size30, which is defined for any given consecutive two–year period as the size at
year t–1, to avoid reclassification bias.
Data is agregated at the level of the location (state) of the establishments and broken
down within state by size and by age of the parent firms. I will thus estimate this
model on two di↵erent set of data, the first set with observations at the state x size
level and the second set at the state x age level.
30In BDS, after computing growth, firms are reclassified into their new size classes, and their new
size becomes their initial size in the following period, March of year t to March of year t + 1.
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The baseline specification for a group of establishments into firm size or age category
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k
are firm size or firm age fixed e↵ects. ↵
s
is a state fixed e↵ect. The election year
dummy (T0) takes a value of one for any state-year following the year in which a
gubernatorial election is held and a value of zero otherwise. As employment rates are
reported as of March 12 of each year in the BDS, a gubernatorial election occurring on
November of year t is matched with changes in employment from March t to March
t+1. The post-election dummy (T1) is defined relative to the election year as T0 + 1
year. The Switch to unified (Divided) dummy is set to 1 when government is divided
(unified) the year the gubernatorial election takes place and becomes unified (divided)
the year after, as a result of the election. Republican governor is an indicator variable
that takes a value of one when the governor is a Republican and zero otherwise.
Results
A weakly significant negative e↵ect is found on the job creation rate following a switch
from divided to unified government. The magnitude of the e↵ect varies between -0.3
and -0.25 percentage point. Results by state x size are presented in table 1.7 and
results by state x age are presented in table 1.8. The absence of any e↵ects on the
job destruction side could point to some asymmetries in the job adjustment process
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with more hysteresis on the job destruction side. The net job creation however,
whose coe cient estimate is the di↵erence between job creation job destruction, is
not statistically significant.
[ insert Table 1.7 here ]
[ insert Table 1.8 here ]
In table 1.9, I estimate the same model over 4 sub-samples based on the size of the
parent-firm, as measured by its number of employees. The coe cient estimates (-
0.45) when the baseline specification is run on a sub-sample of firms with less than
20 employees is twice as large as the average e↵ect and significant at the 10% level.
For larger firms the sign of the coe cient is negative but the e↵ect is not statisti-
cally significant. Results for larger size firms should be interpreted with precautions
because the size criteria is based on the size of the parent firm whose location can
be di↵erent than the one of the establishments for which the job flows are reported.
Looking at the sub-sample of smaller firms however is relevant since the total number
of firms and of establishments reported in each state are really close, suggesting that
those firms are mainly single establishment firms or multi-establishment firms located
in the same state as their parent firm. As such they have a higher exposure to their
state policy.
A weakly significant e↵ect is found on the job destruction rate as well for the smallest
firms. This could suggest a ”wait-and-see” e↵ect since job destruction rate is also
negatively a↵ected so that the net creation rate remains basically unchanged.
[ insert Table 1.9 here ]
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Overall, the employment results support the investment empirical findings with switches
from a divided to a unified government leading firms to hold back on their employ-
ment decisions, both on the creation side and on the destruction side. Consistent with
the assumption that state political cycles matter, younger firms and smaller firms for
which we are thus almost certain that they are entirely located in a given state, are
found to be the most a↵ected.
In the next section, I use a regression discontinuity design to address remaining
concerns that unobserved state-level economic conditions or anticipated state-level
economic conditions may be driving both the election outcomes and the invest-
ment/employment cycle.
1.6 Regression Discontinuity Design
One of the concern for identification is that that voters’ decision may not be exogenous
to anticipated economic conditions when making their party choice. For example
it could be that voters think that divided government are better able to manage
economic booms but believe that a unified government is better suited to address crisis
times. If anticipated economic conditions are not fully captured by the covariates,
then the documented drop in investment may just reflect an expected change from
a growth to a recession economic environment, perfectly correlated with a switch to
unified government.
To account for this possibility, I use a regression discontinuity design (RD). Recent
contributions implementing a similar design in gubernatorial elections include Folke
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and Snyder (2012) and Erikson et al. (2015). As stated by Erikson et al. (2015),
the basic idea behind this is that in very close elections the party of the governor
is decided essentially by a coin flip. Thus, looking at a sub-sample of states that
were divided ex-ante, those states that became unified because a governor barely won
an election and those that stayed divided because a governor barely lost an election
should be nearly identical except on dimensions that are directly a↵ected by the
election outcome.
Focusing on these very close elections therefore allows me to estimate the causal
e↵ect of full or split government partisan control, as decided by the party of the
governor. The policy e↵ect is estimated from the discontinuity that occurs when a
gubernatorial candidate wins more than 50% of the vote so that the party a liated
with the Governor in the state Legislature switches from being the minority party to
being the majority party.
Empirical strategy and identification assumptions
The RD regression follows the control function approach. As conventional in RD
approaches, I use a separate control function on each side of the threshold by in-
cluding interactions between the treatment variable “DU” and the electoral victory
margin. The control function is a second or third-order polynomial function of the
forcing variable, V
s,t 1, which is the margin of winning or losing in the gubernatorial
election for the candidate whose party is aligned with the majority party elected of
the Legislature in state s at time t 1. V is centered at the cut-o↵ point prior to
running the regression.
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The basic idea behind this specification is that the treatment variable, Switch to
Unified, is entirely determined by the forcing variable. Because of this, we can control
for potential endogeneity of the treatment variable, and also deal with other problems,
such as omitted variable bias, by allowing flexibly in the forcing variable.


















s,t 1) = b1V + c1V 2 + d1V 3 + b2V ⇥DU + c2V 2 ⇥DU + d2V 3 ⇥DU
Following the literature (e.g. Erikson et al. (2015); Folke and Snyder (2012)), I limit
the sample to observations where the parties have between 30% and 70% of the vote
share to reduce the possibility of over-fitting the control polynomials by including
outliers in the tails of the vote share distribution.
I also restrict my sample to divided states in the pre-election term and to states that
switch either to being unified after the election, or to being divided but with the
governor being confronted to a majority from the opposite party in both chambers of
the Legislature. Basically I drop split legislatures from the divided cases considered
in the post election term. This is to ensure that only the governor election results
can potentially change the treatment assignment from divided government to unified
government or vice versa, as described on figure 1.8.
[ insert Figure 1.8 here ]
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The main drawback from this approach is that it provides global estimates of the
regression function that uses data far from the cuto↵. As further robustness I also
use a non parametric RD approach, which limits the sample to “close” elections i.e.
those where the winner’s share of the vote is close to 50%. I present results based
on di↵erent vote margins around 50% to define close elections. I use a 3% and a 2%
window i.e. I use observations that are at maximum 3% away or 2% away from the
treatment boundary. Though I have too little observations in these windows (35 and
29 elections respectively) for my coe cients to be consistently estimated, presenting
the full battery of estimates shows whether or not the estimates found using tight
bounds — which have small sample sizes — are stable as we move away from the
threshold and increase the sample size.
The identifying assumptions of the approach are the following. First, there has to
be some randomness in the final election results. Second, there must not be any
sorting around the discontinuity, i.e. there must not be any manipulation of election
results by candidates close to the threshold. This assumption will be checked by
investigating the smoothness of the density of observations around the threshold. My
case departs from standard RD applications using electoral victory margin as the
outcome is measured at the firm level, while the close-to-randomization e↵ect under
the RD assumption is at the state level. However it provides a nice robustness test
of the OLS results derived in section 3.
Given that the switch to a divided or a unified government is the joint outcome from
several elections, the Governor election but also all the elections of the members of the
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State Lower and Upper House, the assumption that individuals do not have precise
control over the forcing variable seems reasonable.
Common practice is to graph the density of the assignment variable to see if there are
any discontinuity at the cut-o↵ point, with a very di↵erent number of observations just
below and above the threshold, driven by the treatment being perceive as desirable
or not. However it should be noticed that even if there is some kind of sorting around
the discontinuity threshold, it would not necessarily a↵ect the validity of the set up
for the outcome of interest as being exogenous to business is di↵erent from being
exogenous to voters. For finding an imbalance to be a concern one should assume
that there exists some unobservable variable that a↵ect the choice of the voters for
a unified or divided government and that this variable also directly a↵ect business
investment.
As reported in panel B1 of table 1.1, which summarizes the election margin variable,
the gubernatorial election margin variable is distributed quite symmetrically about 0,
with a mean of -0.2% and a standard deviation of 8.37%, and an inter-quartile range of
-6.1 to 6.1. The Republicans control the governorship in 46% of the elections. In more
about 45% of the elections in our main sample (53 out of 118) the winning margin is
below 5%. However, as illustrated in histograms of figures 8 and 9, the distribution
is not as smooth as one could expect in a larger sample size. There are not the exact
same numbers of observations in the interval [-4;0) as in the interval [0;4). I have
18 elections below the threshold and 25 above. Because of my limited sample size I
cannot rule out that there is no sorting of observations across the threshold. However
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the hypothesis seems unlikely to be directly related to the investment outcome since
there are more states above than below the threshold, while crossing the threshold is
unattractive from the firms’ point of view.
[ insert Figure 1.9 here ]
[ insert Figure 1.10 here ]
Graphical Analysis
Following previous RD work, we begin with a graphical analysis. Figures 9A and
B illustrate the regression discontinuity in the switch to unified government context
(fig.10) and in the switch to divided context (fig.11). It plots the estimated change in
firm investment rate in t + 1 (T1) as a function of the vote share margin of victory in
election t (T0) of the gubernatorial candidate whose party is aligned with the majority
party holding the legislature. Each point is an average of changes in firm investment
rate in t + 1(T1) for each interval, which is 0.5% wide. In figure 1.11, points to the
left of the y axis represent subsequent investment outcomes when previously divided
governments stay divided, those to the right are previously divided governments that
switch to unified.
As apparent from the figure, there is a discontinuous jump, right at the 0 point,
indicating that investment drops in states that barely switched to unified while it
remains stable in those that barely stayed divided. As long as states in which the
candidates, whose party is aligned with the majority winning the legislature, barely
win and states in which they barely lost, are ex ante comparable (on average) in
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all other ways, the di↵erence can properly be interpreted as the causal e↵ect of the
election outcome i.e. the change from a divided to a unified government.
In figure 1.12, points to the left of the y axis represent subsequent investment outcomes
when previously unified governments stay unified, those to the right are for previously
unified government that switch to divided.
[ insert Figure 1.11 here ]
[ insert Figure 1.12 here ]
Regression Analyses
I now turn to regressions. Table 1.10 presents the main results of the RD estimation
for the switch to unified.
[ insert Table 1.10 here ]
Specification 1 is the baseline specification, estimated on the sub-sample used for the
RD. The coe cient estimate of the switch to unified (-.012 ; p-value < 0.05) is higher
to the one for the full sample estimation (-0.008), suggesting that OLS under estimate
the investment sensitivity somewhat.
The results for the RD specifications show quite stable point estimates for the RD, in
the range -0.012 to -0.020 (see columns 1 to 6). The magnitude of the e↵ect translates
into a 4.5 percent to 7.5 percent drop when reported to the average investment rate.
The results hold with and without covariates and are robust to a placebo test in the
year before the election outcomes are known (cf. figure 10 in next section). Finally,
when looking at very close races (columns 7 and 8), the non parametric approach
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yields a negative e↵ect of a similar order of magnitude. Given the small number of
observations though the result is not robust.
To have more observations one should explore the possibility of using a modified
discontinuity design, with treatment resulting for the joint outcome of multiple as-
signment variables, not limited to governor elections but also including elections of
each senate, and house members.
Table 1.11 presents the results of a similar analysis for the switch from unified to
divided. The assignment variable is now the share of the votes received by the guber-
natorial candidate whose party is not} aligned with the party controlling the house
and the senate. In this specification, the policy e↵ect is estimated from the disconti-
nuity that occurs when a gubernatorial candidate wins more than 50% of the vote so
that the party a liated with the Governor in the state Legislature switches from be-
ing the majority party to being the minority party. The coe cient estimates are very
similar to the estimates from the main OLS specification. They are slightly negative,
quite stable across the specifications and none of them is statistically significant. The
post election dummy in this case is never significant either which may suggest that
these races were ex-ante less uncertain than the elections of the first sub-sample.
[ insert Table 1.11 here ]
Robustness
To check the validity of the regression discontinuity design, I conduct a placebo test
using the exact same sample of states but looking at investment rate in the election
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year i.e. before the election results are known. There is no discontinuity that could
have indicated hat the e↵ect was anticipated or that the e↵ect is driven by ex-ante
already present di↵erences between those states ( figure 1.13). As suggested in Im-
bens and Lemieux (2008), I then only look at one side of the discontinuity (when
government switch to unified) and take the median of the margin of victory, which
is equal to 6.5%, and I test for a discontinuity in that part.There is none (cf. figure
1.14).
Finally I also test whether other covariates exhibit a jump at the discontinuity. I
do not find any evidence of discontinuity at the margin of victory threshold, as il-
lustrated by figure 1.15. This is confirmed by a formal regression analysis using the
covariates as a left-hand side variable. The RD estimates support the results from the
di↵erence-in-di↵erence approach, and show that giving a single party full control over
a state, by winning the governor’s election, systematically leads to a significant drop
in the investment rate of firms headquartered in that state in the post-election year.
Although the RD estimates enable us to gain confidence in establishing that there is
a negative e↵ect of a change from a divided to unified government on corporate in-
vestment, they say little about why this is the case. In the rest of the paper I explore
the assumption that policy uncertainty may be one of the underlying mechanisms
driving the results.
[ insert Figures 1.13,1.14, 1.15 here ]
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1.7 The Policy Uncertainty Channel
In this section, I investigate the assumption that policy uncertainty is one of the
potential channels through which a change from a divided to a unified government
may lead to measurable changes in economic activity.
Government policy, including state level policy, represents a large source of uncer-
tainty for many firms. Firms do care about which laws or regulation is likely to be
passed and how it may impact their profits and operation capabilities (cf. examples
of 10-Ks citations from the risk factors sections). The topic has received a lot of
interest lately with a growing literature looking at the relation between policy uncer-
tainty and corporate investment (Julio and Yook (2012); Gulen and Ion (2015)) or
asset prices (Pástor and Veronesi (2013); Kelly et al. (2016)). While Democratic and
Republican parties have di↵erent political agendas, the concept of unified government
is important in state lawmaking because the governor, the senate and the house all
play decisive roles in turning a partisan agenda into state legislation.
Election results partially resolve uncertainty related to future government policies,
but may not be very informative about the probability that a policy shift will occur.
It seems likely that whether a given party fully controls the government a↵ects its
ability to pass bills, and that this ability is higher when the elected government is
unified.31
31A unified government is not a su cient condition for legislation to be passed, as another layer
of analysis – not yet taken into account in this draft - is the existence of supermajority rules in both
legislative bodies. Most states define a supermajority as either sixty percent or two-thirds of seats
held by a single party. Supermajority procedures and heterogeneous preferences make gridlock also
possible in a unified government.
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As American politics is polarized, unified governments are likely to yield strong par-
tisan outcomes in the form of more extreme economic policy choices. An example of
such choices can be found in the “Kansas experiment” under the unified government
of Republican governor Sam Brownback who enacted a major tax cut for individuals
and businesses.
On the contrary, electing a divided government has been theorized as a way for voters
to get middle-ground policy through institutional balancing (Alesina and Rosenthal
(1989); Fiorina (1991)). In addition, since passing legislation requires bipartisan
support, policy decisions enacted by a divided government are more likely to be
durable and to survive majority changes. Democratic Massachusetts governed by
Republican William Weld in the 1990s illustrates a relatively smoothly run divided
state. In case no cooperative equilibrium is reached however, the default option is
the status quo, often called “gridlock”.
Under the gridlock theory, conflict between opposing parties in a divided govern-
ment increases the likelihood of stalemate in the policy-making process Binder, 2003;
Bowling, 2001). This assumption echoes the literature on decision making in political
system with veto players, which suggests that the potential for policy change decreases
as the number of groups with institutional veto power increases (Tsebelis (1995)). An
example of such political gridlock is the struggle over the Minnesota budget between
Democrat governor Mark Dayton and the Republican controlled legislature which led
to three weeks of state government shutdown in 2011.
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1.7.1 Empirical strategy and identification assumption
My identification assumption in this section is that a switch from a divided to a unified
government raises policy uncertainty by ending the status quo regime and increasing
the probability of economic policy changes in general, and of more polarized changes
in particular. As a result policy uncertainty is assumed to be on average higher in
the post election year when government switches from divided to unified relative to
other post election outcomes.
The main mechanism through which uncertainty can a↵ect investment is through a
real option e↵ect. If investment is irreversible, uncertainty increases the value of wait-
ing for new information before investing in a project. As a result uncertainty creates
incentives to postpone investment.32 To pin down the policy uncertainty channel I
conduct several cross-sectional tests to see whether firms that are ex-ante likely to be
more sensitive to uncertainty have a larger response to shocks induced by switches
from divided to unified governments, and from unified to divided governments.
1.7.2 Investment irreversibility
In this subsection I explore the predictions of the real option theory of investment
that firms that exhibit higher investment irreversibility are especially sensitive to
uncertainty.
When investment expenditures are irreversible (because capital is firm or industry
32Note that, as underlined by Julio and Yook (2012) the underlying mechanism does not necessarily
require an extreme policy outcome to be likely to create incentives to wait. Even a positive change
in policy, by reordering the ranking of the expected returns of mutually exclusive projects, can a↵ect
how the firm allocates its investment spending.
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specific) or partially irreversible (because of “lemons” problems and low resale value),
and can be delayed, allowing the firm to wait for new information about market con-
ditions before committing resources, then greater uncertainty creates incentives to
wait before investing (Pindyck (1991)). Uncertainty about future investment oppor-
tunities raises the opportunity cost of investing (the value of the option to invest) and
creates incentives for firms to delay capital expenditures. The intuition behind this
prediction is that the region of inaction for investment policies expands when uncer-
tainty increases, and more so for firms whose capital is more di cult to liquidate in
bad times (Bloom (2009)).
If the sensitivity of investment to changes in party alignment control of state gov-
ernment operates through the uncertainty channel then we should expect firms with
more irreversible investments to be more a↵ected.
I use the ratio of fixed assets to total assets measured as PPE divided by total assets
as a proxy for investment irreversibility. Following the literature (e.g. Gulen and
Ion (2015)) I interpret firms with higher ratios of fixed to total assets as having
higher adjustment costs. I rank firms based on their fixed assets ratio and assign
them to terciles of the distribution and run three separate regressions fro each of the
sub-samples. Table 1.12 presents the results.
[ insert Table 1.12 ]
[ insert Table 1.13 ]
Consistently with the policy uncertainty assumption the magnitude of the coe cient
is larger in the sub-sample with a higher PP&E ratio (third tercile) - a proxy for
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higher investment irreversibility - than in the rest of the population. It is about twice
the average population e↵ect. As asset tangibility may be positively correlated with
firm size, and as large firms are more geographically diversified the total e↵ect may be
attenuated. I then restrict my sample to small firms (table 1.13) (total assets below
the median of the population distribution) and split it further to estimate the model
over two sub-samples of “high tangibility” and “low tangibility” firms, based on their
PP&E ratio being above or below the median of the ratio distribution in the small
firms sample.
The magnitude of the negative e↵ect of a switch to a unified government increase to
0.16 percentage point in the sub-sample of firms which are both more exposed to their
home state and have a higher degree of irreversibility. Though the findings are in line
with the assumption of a policy uncertainty channel, t-tests for statistical di↵erence
of the e↵ect across these sub-samples are not significant as standard variation is high.
The main caveat of using the PP&E ratio is that it does not take into account other
determinants of adjustment costs such as asset specificity or mobility. To address this
concern, I then use an industry-level measure proposed by Kim and Kung (2016) as
a proxy for the salability of assets across industries. The intuition is that firms in
industries with more redeployable assets will benefit from a more active second hand
market for these assets and will therefore be able to recover a higher proportion of
their investments.
[ insert Table 1.14 ]
Kim and Kung (2016) construct their measure of asset redeployability based on the
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salability of assets across industries. They measure the across-industry redeployability
of a given asset by computing the proportion of industries in which the asset is
used (using the Bureau of Economic Analysis 1997 capital flow table). The more
industries use an asset, the more redeployable is the asset and thus the higher the
redeployability score. A lower redeployability score is interpreted as higher costs of
reversing investment decisions in the absence of a liquid secondary market to sell
the assets. I find results in line with the predictions of the literature on irreversible
investment for a sub-sample of small firms i.e. for firms that are likely to be more
sensitive to state-level policy.
As shown in table 1.14, firms with less redeployable assets decrease investment sig-
nificantly more in response to elections leading to a shift from a divided to a unified
government than their counterparts with more redeployable assets. In this specific
sub-sample, the magnitude of the e↵ect is twice as big as the drop in investment in
the pre-election period, typically documented in the literature using electoral cycles
as a proxy for policy uncertainty.
Overall the results are consistent with the assumption of policy uncertainty rising
with a change in regime from a divided to a unified government and translating into
an negative e↵ect on investment, through a “wait-and-see” channel.
1.7.3 Policy Uncertainty and R&D intensity
In this subsection I test for the ”bright sides of political uncertainty” (Atanassov
et al. (2015)) that R&D investments respond positively to increased uncertainty, in
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line with previous empirical literature findings (Atanassov et al. (2015) 33). Results
are reported in table 1.15.
I keep the same specification but the dependent variable in all regressions is now R&D
intensity, defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets. I do not find any
significant e↵ect for the average firm. However the smallest firms have a significant
8 percent increase in R&D intensity in the post-election year following a switch from
divided to unified government. The e↵ect adds up to the positive e↵ect documented
by Atanassov et al. (2015) in the year before the election. I confirm their e↵ect both
for the average firm and in the small firms sub-sample.
[ insert Table 1.15 ]
1.8 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the debate on the real e↵ects of politics, and more specifi-
cally its e↵ect on firm performance and corporate decisions, and to our understanding
of the economic e↵ects of checks and balances.
Using a sample of 408 US gubernatorial elections held between 1978 and 2010, which
resulted into 82 staggered switches from divided to unified governments, I document
novel and robust evidence that changes in full or split partisan control over a state
government, within the same political regime, induce cycles in corporate investment
and employment.
33They specifically find that electoral uncertainty before gubernatorial elections in the US encour-
ages firm-level R&D.
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Controlling for investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q and cash flows), demand (sales-
growth), overall economic conditions (GDP growth and unemployment rate) and par-
tisan e↵ects (party of the governor, incumbency, change in partisan majority among
others), I find evidence of a persistent negative relationship between switches from di-
vided to unified governments and investment. Specifically, corporate investment rates
drop by an economically meaningful average of 3 to 5 percent in the year following
elections when government switches from unified to divided, relative to investment
rates in other post-election years.
These results are robust to various empirical specifications including a regression dis-
continuity design using the discontinuity that occurs when a gubernatorial candidate
wins more than 50% of the votes, leading his party to switch from the minority to
the majority party in the state legislature.
Evidence of a higher sensitivity for smaller firms, as well as capital intensive firms sup-
ports the hypothesis that changes in partisan control alignment translate into changes
in the degree of policy uncertainty, which in turn a↵ects the investment and employ-
ment cycles. It suggests that partisan alignment between executive and legislative
powers may be as relevant to explain corporate outcomes as partisan preferences over
policy, through the channel of policy uncertainty.
More broadly, these results highlight the interplay between political cycles and corpo-
rate decisions, and the possibility that checks and balances directly influence corporate
decision-making and that political compromise or political gridlock leads to smoother
business cycles.
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Figure 1.1: State legislatures under divided government, 1978-2010
Figure 1.1 tracks the number of US states out of the 46 states in the sample, which have a divided
government, for each year, over the sample period 1978-2010.
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Figure 1.2: Gubernatorial Elections, Partisanship and State Government Control Changes over
time, 1978-2010
Figure 1.2 plots changes in partisan alignment following gubernatorial elections over time, for the
46 states in the sample, over the sample period 1978-2010.
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Figure 1.3: Partisan control of state legislatures, 1978-2010
Figure 1.3 represents the percentage of time a state has been governed by a unified Democratic
government, a unified Republican government or a divided government, for the 46 states in the
sample, over the sample period 1978-2010.
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Gubernatorial elections and geography of changes in partisan control of state governments,
1978-2010.
Figure 1.4: Number of Switches from divided to unified.
Figure 1.5: Number of Switches from unified to divided.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 represent the number of switches from divided to unified, and from unified to
divided, by state, that occurred as a result of a gubernatorial election, over the period 1978 to
2010.
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Figure 1.6: Matching election years with fiscal years
Figure 1.6 demonstrates the construction of the post-election year dummy for each firm given the
firm’s fiscal year beginning and end. The post-election dummy variable takes a value of one for
any firm-year in which an election is held no later than 2 months after the fiscal year beginning of
year t and no earlier than 10 months before the fiscal year beginning of year t. The post-election
dummy variable requires that approximately 80% or more of a firm’s fiscal-year days fall after the
election date. All fiscal years for which the election date does not fall within this range have the
election dummy set to a value of zero.
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Figure 1.7: Time dynamic of investment
Figure 1.7 illustrates the e↵ect for the switch from divided to unified.
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Figure 1.8: Regression Discontinuity Design: sample selection
For the RD, the sample is restricted to divided states in the pre-election term, and to states that
end up to be either unified after the election, or to be divided with the governor being confronted
to a majority from the opposite party in both chambers of the Legislature. Split legislatures are
dropped from the divided cases considered in the post election term. This is to ensure that only the
governor election results can potentially change treatment assignment from divided government to
unified government or vice versa.
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Distribution of the assignment variable
Figure 1.9: Histogram with 2 percent bins
Figure 1.10: Histogram with 4 percent bins
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Figure 1.11: Regression Discontinuity: Switch to Unified - Binned averages of changes in investment














-10 -5 0 5 10
Margin of victory in gubernatorial election in % points
Divided States switched to Unified : positive margin ; Divided States stayed Divided: negative margin.
Gubernatorial Elections 1978-2010 - T1 : Change in Firm Investment Rate
Switch from Divided to Unified
Figure 1.11 plots the average annual within-firm change in investment rate net of the contempo-
raneous change in the firm’s Census region (to remove the influence of time-varying changes in
regional economic conditions or nation-wide variation in business conditions that a↵ect all states
simultaneously). Each dot corresponds to the unconditional mean of changes in firms’ investment
rate between t and t+1 within intervals of 0.01 margin of victory in gubernatorial election t.
The solid line represents the predicted values of a second-order polynomial fit, with the blue lines
showing the 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 1.12: Regression Disconinuity: Switch to Divided - Binned averages of changes in investment
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Margin of victory in gubernatorial election in % points
Unified States switched to Divided : positive margin ; Unified States stayed Unified: negative margin.
Gubernatorial Elections 1978-2010 - T1 : Change in Firm Investment Rate
Switch from Unified to Divided
Figure 1.12 plots the average annual within-firm change in investment rate net of the contempo-
raneous change in the firm’s Census region (to remove the influence of time-varying changes in
regional economic conditions or nation-wide variation in business conditions that a↵ect all states
simultaneously). Each dot corresponds to the unconditional mean of changes in firms’ investment
rate between t and t+1 within intervals of 0.01 margin of victory in gubernatorial election t.
The solid line represents the predicted values of a second-order polynomial fit, with the blue lines
showing the 95% confidence intervals.
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Margin of victory in gubernatorial election in % points
Divided States WILL switch to Unified a year forward: positive margin ; Divided States WILL stay Divided a year forward: negative margin.
Gubernatorial Elections 1978-2010 - T=0 (pre-election year) - Change in Firm Investment Rate
Switch from Divided to Unified - PLACEBO TEST in t=0
Figure 1.14: Regression Discontinuity: Switch to Unified - Placebo test using median voteshare as
the threshold.
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Figure 1.15: Switch to Unified - E↵ects on other covariates
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Divided States switched to Unified : positive margin ; Divided States stayed Divided: negative margin.
Real Gross State Product - Gubernatorial Elections 1978-2010 - T1 :  real GSP growth
Switch from Divided to Unified
(d) State GDP
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Table 1.1: Election Summary Statistics
Panel A : Election Characteristics
Panel A1 reports various summary statistics for gubernatorial elections held between 1978 and 2010 in 46 states
with bicameral legislature.
Panel B1 : Divided to Unified Analysis
Panel B report summary statistics for the margin of victory of gubernatorial elections used in the Regression
Discontinuity section. Elections in Panel B1 (B2) led to a transition from a divided (unified) to a unified government
(positive margin of victory) or a transition from a divided (unified) to a simple divided government (negative margin
of victory). A 5% margin range implies that the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate whose party is aligned
with the party controlling the house and the senate is between 45% and 55%.
Panel B2 : Unified to Divided Analysis
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Table 1.2: Firm Summary Statistics
Panel B : Financial Characteristics
Panel B reports summary statistics for the firm characteristics used in the analysis. Total Assets is book value
of assets. Investment is measured as firm-level yearly capital expenditures normalized by beginning-of-fiscal-year
firm net property, plant, and equipment (ppent). Asset tangibility is the ratio of net PP&E over end-of-fiscal-year
total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Cash flow is defined
as earnings before interest and taxes minus taxes and interest expense plus depreciation and amortization scaled
by beginning-of-fiscal-year total assets. Sales growth is measured as the log di↵erence in yearly sales (sale). Cash
holding is measured as cash and short term investments (che) divided by beginning- of-fiscal-year total asset. Return
on asset (ROA) is calculated as yearly net income (ib) divided by one fiscal year lagged total asset. Return on
equity (ROE) is calculated as yearly net income divided by one fiscal year lagged book equity. Leverage is long
term debt + short term debt (dltt + dlc) scaled by beginning-of-fiscal-year book value of assets. R&D is measured
as firms’ research and development expenditures as reported in Compustat (xrd).
Panel C : State-level statistics on gross and net employment flows
Panel C reports summary statistics for state-level gross and net job flows. The unit of observation is the establish-
ment defined as the fixed physical location where economic activity occurs. Size and age categories are based on
the age of the parent firm. For each state, job creation (destruction) rate is the ratio of the sum of all employment
gains (losses) from establishments located in that state, from year t-1 to year t, including establishment start-ups
(deaths), divided by average of state employment for times t and t-1. All growth rates are based on March to March
changes.
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Table 1.3: Checks & Balances and Corporate Investment





+  0Elections,t +  1PostElections,t +  2PostElections,t ⇤DUs,t +  3PostElections,t ⇤ UDs,t
+ 1TobinQi,s,t 1 +  2CFi,s,t +  3Salei,s,t 1 +  4Sizei,s,t 1 +   GSPs,t 1 + c0Republicans,t +RegionR,t + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, s indexes state, R indexes Census region and t denotes time. RegionRt is Census region x year fixed e↵ects. The dependent
variable is the investment rate defined as Capex scaled by lagged PPE. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value
of assets. CF is cash flow scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. Size is the logarithm of total assets. Sales growth is growth in sales over the
previous year. %change in GSP is the percentage change in real gross state product for a given state over the previous year. The post-election
dummy (T1) takes a value of one for any firm-year in which an election is held no later than 2 month after the fiscal year beginning of year t
and no earlier than 10 months before the fiscal year beginning of year t. All fiscal years for which the election date does not fall within this
range have the T1 dummy set to a value of zero. The Switch to unified (Divided) dummy is set to 1 when government is divided (unified)
the year the gubernatorial election takes place and becomes unified (divided) the year after, as a result of the election. Republican is an
indicator variable that takes a value of one when the elected governor is a Republican. In the last specification, I exclude the nine states in
which governor elections are concurrent with presidential elections. All independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation
to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and
Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.77
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Table 1.4: Corporate Investment and Changes in State Partisan Control














i indexes firm, s indexes state, R indexes Census region and t denotes time. RegionRt is Census region x year
fixed e↵ects. The dependent variable is the investment rate defined as Capex scaled by lagged PPE. The Switch
dummy takes a value of 1 when the election results in a change in the split vs. full partisan control i.e. Switch=1 in
states where government switches from unified to divided AND in states where government switches from divided
to unified. Switch to unified (divided) dummy is set to 1 when government is divided (unified) the year the
gubernatorial election takes place and becomes unified (divided) the year after, as a result of the election. All
independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust
standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009).
Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.5: The time dynamic of investment














i indexes firm, s indexes state, R indexes Census region and t denotes time. RegionRt is Census region x year fixed e↵ects. The dependent
variable is the investment rate defined as Capex scaled by lagged PPE. Years T(-1), T0 and T2 are defined relative to the post-election year
(T1) as, respectively, T1 - 1 year, T1 + 1 year and T1 + 2 years. All independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation
to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and
Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 1.6: Checks and Balances and Corporate Investment, analysis across firm sizes
Table 1.6 presents estimates for the baseline model specification for sub-samples based on the size of the firms as measured by total assets. In
column 1 the sample is restricted to the smallest firms, whose total assets is in the first quintile of the population distribution over the sample
period. Columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 use samples made , respectively, of the second, third, fourth and fifth quintiles. All independent variables are
divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and
year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Checks & Balances and Job Creation (by state*firm age)














s indexes the state of the establishment, k indexes the age category of the parent firm, R indexes Census region and t denotes time. Region R,t
is Census region-year fixed e↵ects. The main dependent variable is the JCRkst, the job creation rate in state s between year t and year t-1,
in percentages. For each state, JCRkst is the ratio of the sum of all employment gains from expanding establishments from year t-1 to year
t divided by average of state employment for times t and t-1. %change real GSP/capita is the percentage change in real gross state product
per capita for a given state from year t-2 to and t-1.The election year dummy (T0) takes a value of one for any state-year following the year
in which a gubernatorial election is held and a value of zero otherwise. As employment rates are reported as of March 12th of each year in
the BDS, a gubernatorial election occurring on November of year t is matched with changes in employment from March t to March t+1. The
post-election dummy (T1) is defined relative to the election year as T0 + 1 year. The Switch to unified (Divided) dummy is set to 1 when
government is divided (unified) the year the gubernatorial election takes place and becomes unified (divided) the year after, as a result of the
election. Republican governor is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when the governor is a Republican and zero otherwise. All
independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered
by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Checks & Balances and Job Creation (by state*firm size)














s indexes the state of the establishment, k indexes the size category of the parent firm, R indexes Census region and t denotes time. Region R,t
is Census region-year fixed e↵ects. The main dependent variable is JCRkst, the job creation rate in state s between year t and year t-1, in
percentages. For each state, JCRkst is the ratio of the sum of all employment gains from expanding establishments from year t-1 to year t
divided by average of state employment for times t and t-1. %change real GSP/capita is the percentage change in real gross state product
per capita for a given state from year t-2 to and t-1.The election year dummy (T0) takes a value of one for any state-year following the year
in which a gubernatorial election is held and a value of zero otherwise. As employment rates are reported as of March 12th of each year in
the BDS, a gubernatorial election occurring on November of year t is matched with changes in employment from March t to March t+1. The
post-election dummy (T1) is defined relative to the election year as T0 + 1 year. The Switch to unified (Divided) dummy is set to 1 when
government is divided (unified) the year the gubernatorial election takes place and becomes unified (divided) the year after, as a result of the
election. Republican governor is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when the governor is a Republican and zero otherwise. All
independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered
by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Checks & Balances and Job Creation - Young vs. Old firms
Table 1.9 presents estimates for the same specification as in table 12 for sub-samples of the establishment population for which the parent firm
is 5 year-old or less (”Start-ups”) and for which the parent firm is older than 5 year old (”Others”). The left hand side variables are the job
creation rate and the job destruction rate in state s between year t and year t-1, in percentages. For each state, JCRkst is the ratio of the sum
of all employment gains from expanding establishments from year t-1 to year t - including establishment startups - divided by average of state
employment for times t and t-1.
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Table 1.10: Regression Discontinuity Design - Switch from divided to unified

















s,t 1) = b1V + c1V 2 + d1V 3 + b2V ⇥DU + c2V 2 ⇥DU + d2V 3 ⇥DU
In this regression discontinuity specification, the sample is limited to gubernatorial terms of divided states that either stayed divided or switched
to unified. I drop non-contested elections (those in which one party won more than 70% of the votes). Specification 1 is the baseline specification
estimated on the sub-sample used for the RD. Specifications 2 and 3 add the share of the votes received by the gubernatorial candidate whose
party is aligned with the party controlling the house and the senate. Specification 2 includes a quadratic functional form for the assignment
variable (election margin) and specification 3 a cubic form. Both polynomial forms have interaction terms with the treatment variable (Switch
to unified) so that a two-degree polynomial or three-degree polynomial is estimated on each side of the cuto↵. Column 4 and 5 consider close
gubernatorial elections, within a 3% and 2% margin. A 3% margin implies that the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate whose party
is aligned with the party controlling the house and the senate is between 47% and 53%.All independent variables are divided by their sample
standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron
et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.11: Regression Discontinuity Design - Switch from unified to divided
This table presents estimates from investment regressions with the same specification as in table 15, except that the partisan control switch of

















s,t 1) = b1V + c1V 2 + d1V 3 + b2V ⇥ UD + c2V 2 ⇥ UD + d2V 3 ⇥ UD
In this regression discontinuity specification, the sample is limited to gubernatorial terms of divided states that either stayed divided or switched
to unified. I drop non-contested elections (those in which one party won more than 70% of the votes). Specification 1 is the baseline specification
estimated on the sub-sample used for the RD. Specifications 2 and 3 add the share of the votes received by the gubernatorial candidate whose
party is aligned with the party controlling the house and the senate. Specification 2 includes a quadratic functional form for the assignment
variable (election margin) and specification 3 a cubic form. Both polynomial forms have interaction terms with the treatment variable (Switch
to divided) so that a two-degree polynomial or three-degree polynomial is estimated on each side of the cuto↵. Column 4 and 5 consider close
gubernatorial elections, within a 3% and 2% margin. A 3% margin implies that the vote share of the gubernatorial candidate whose party is
aligned with the party controlling the house and the senate is between 47% and 53%. All independent variables are divided by their sample
standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron
et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.12: Investment Irreversibility and the Policy Uncertainty Channel
Table 1.12 presents estimation results based on the baseline specification.The model is estimated separately for sub-
samples of firms sorted over the sample period, based on their fixed assets ratio defined as PP&E over lagged total
assets. In column 1 the sub-sample is made of firms with a PP&E ratio in the first tercile of the ratio distribution
in the population. Columns 2 and 3 look at the second and third terciles. All other variables are defined as before.
Only the coe cients of interest are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year,
following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.13: Investment Irreversibility and the Policy Uncertainty Channel for small firms
Table 1.13 presents estimation results based on the baseline specification.The model is estimated on a the subsample
of small firms (total assets below sample median). Low tangibility firms have below median fixed assets ratio (defined
as PP&E over lagged total assets). High tangibility firms have above median fixed assets ratio (defined as PP&E
over lagged total assets). All other variables are defined as before. Only the coe cients of interest are reported.
Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen
(2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.14: Investment Redeployability and the Policy Uncertainty Channel
Table 1.14 presents estimation results based on the baseline specification. The sample is restricted to firms in the
industries identified as ”low redeployability” and ”high redeployability” in Kim and Kung (2014) and the analysis
compares the average e↵ect and the e↵ect on small firms (first quartile of total assets distribution). Columns 1
and 2 look at the 15 most redeployable industries, for all and small firms. Columns 3 and 4 look at the 15 less
redeployable industries, for all and small firms. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year,
following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.15: R&D intensity and the Policy Uncertainty Channel
Table 1.15 presents estimation results based on the baseline specification.The model is estimated separately for sub-
samples of firms sorted over the sample period, based on their fixed assets ratio defined as PP&E over lagged total
assets. In column 1 the sub-sample is made of firms with a PP&E ratio in the first tercile of the ratio distribution
in the population. Columns 2 and 3 look at the second and third terciles. All other variables are defined as before.
Only the coe cients of interest are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year,
following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Appendix : Robustness Checks
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Table 1.16: Robustness - Additional State Macroeconomic Controls
Table 1.16 presents estimation results from various robustness tests based on the baseline specification. In column 1 the baseline specification
is run on a shorter sub-period excluding the financial crisis. Column 2 to 5 add additional state-level macro variables i.e. the lagged change in
employment rate, the change in state budget surplus, debt outstanding and state tax revenue (as a percentage of GSP). Only the parameters
of interest are reported. All independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. All
independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered
by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.17: Robustness - Partisanship Controls
Table 1.17presents estimation results from various robustness tests based on the baseline specification. Column 1 and 2 report the estimates
from the inclusion of a dummy, which is set equal to one when government is divided before the election and stays divided as a result of the
election. Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates from the inclusion of a dummy which is set equal to one when government is unified before
the election and stays unified as a result of the election. Column 5 and 6 look at the e↵ect of a change in the party of the elected governor.
Columns 7 to 9 add a ”non-incumbent” dummy variable and its interactions with our treatment variables. The non incumbent dummy is set to
1 when the elected governor has not served in the past.. All independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate
economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen
(2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.18: Robustness - Political Controls
Table 1.18presents estimation results from various robustness tests controlling for the party of the elected governor
and excluding Southern states. Column 1 excludes the 16 states that make the Census South region : DE, FL,
GE, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, TX. Columns 2 to 5 control for the partisanship of
the elected governor by interacting the party of the governor with the post-election year indicator variable as well
as with the indicators of a change to divided or to unified. The governor party dummy is set to one for Democrat
governors and zero otherwise. All independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate
economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron
et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.19: Robustness - Incumbent party
Table 1.19 presents estimation results from various robustness tests controlling for the party of the incumbent
governor. Columns 1 to 5 control for the partisanship of the incumbent governor by interacting the party of the
leaving governor with the post-election year indicator variable as well as with the indicators of a change to divided
or to unified. The governor party dummy is set to one for Democrat governors and zero otherwise. All independent
variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard
errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated
t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 1.20: Robustness - Additional firm controls
Table 1.20 reports the results of various robustness checks. Column 1 reports the specification that includes leverage
(short term and long term debt scaled by total assets). Column 2 adds tangibility (Net PP&E over Total Assets),
column 3 adds cash holdings (cash and short-term investments scaled by total assets), and columns 4 and 5 report
specifications controlling for the age of the firm. All independent variables are divided by their sample standard
deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year,
following Cameron et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.21: Robustness - Alternative measures of corporate investment
Table 1.21 reports the estimates of investment regressions using alternative definitions of corporate investment.
Column 1 uses delta capital expenditures scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. Column 2 uses he percentage
change in capital expenditures relative to the previous year. Columns 3 to 5 uses capital expenditures scaled by
beginning-of-year total assets. All independent variables are divided by their sample standard deviation to facilitate
economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron
et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.22: Robustness - Alternative measures of post-election year
Table 1.22 reports the estimates of investment regressions using alternative definitions of the post-election year. 1 month definition: the post-
election dummy (T=1) takes a value of one for any firm-year in which an election is held no later than 1 month after the fiscal year beginning of
year t. 3 months definition : the post-election dummy (T=1) takes a value of one for any firm-year in which an election is held no later than 3
months after the fiscal year beginning of year t. 4 months definition : the post-election dummy (T=1) takes a value of one for any firm-year in
which an election is held no later than 3 months after the fiscal year beginning of year t. All independent variables are divided by their sample
standard deviation to facilitate economic interpretation. Robust standard errors are clustered by state or by state and year, following Cameron
et al. (2008) and Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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2 CHAPTER 2 : SME CREDIT EXPANSION IN A CRISIS
This chapter is joint with William Mullins (University of Maryland) and Christophe
Cahn (Banque de France).
2.1 Introduction
Banks play the central role in reducing the asymmetric information costs of lending
to SMEs, making the bank-firm relationship of crucial importance 34. Nonetheless,
SMEs have long complained that banks reduce the availability of credit in bad times,
pushing many such firms into bankruptcy. How to support private lending to SMEs
in times of aggregate contractions is a crucial but still open policy question. This
paper exploits an unexpected drop in the cost faced by banks of funding loans to
some firms in France to uncover how banks adjust their SME lending portfolio in
response, and which firms are most a↵ected by bank belt-tightening in crises.
As part of a suite of unconventional policy moves the European Central Bank (ECB)
and the Banque de France introduced the Additional Credit Claims (ACC) framework
in early 2012, which immediately reduced the cost to banks of funding loans to a
subset of firms (by about 60 basis points). We report several novel findings.
Firstly, the fall in the cost of funding loans is rapidly transmitted into an increase in
the amount of bank credit to SMEs, and, in the two subsequent years, a corresponding
34See for example Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Fama (1985), Diamond (1991), and James (1987)
on the role of banks in lending to small firms; Paravisini (2008), Khwaja and Mian (2008), and
Jiménez et al. (2014) for evidence of di culties in replacing bank financing; Sharpe (1990), Rajan
(1992), Petersen and Rajan (1995, 1994), and Berger and Udell (1995) for the early work on bank
relationships.
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drop in the likelihood of payment defaults to suppliers. That is, lowering banks’ cost of
funding loans in a crisis period causes credit to SMEs to increase and further causes a
reduction in payment defaults, relative to comparable firms. Importantly, this is after
removing all bank-level capital or liquidity shocks (using bank-month fixed e↵ects),
so our results reflect the adjustments to credit made by banks in response to a pure
change in the cost of lending in a crisis period.
We also find evidence that the e↵ect is stronger for firms with only a single bank
relationship – especially those with stronger observables, and with deeper lending
relationships. Our findings suggest that before the shock (but still in a time of
financial system crisis) single-bank firms were more constrained, potentially because
adverse selection makes single-bank firms near-captives of their banks, and thus much
more vulnerable to liquidity shocks a↵ecting their lender (Detragiache et al. (2000)).
Policies to increase bank lending to firms in recessions have been an area of major pol-
icy activism in recent years: for example, in 2012 the United Kingdom introduced the
Funding for Lending Scheme, while the Eurosystem introduced the ACC framework
and subsequently the Targeted Long-Term Refinancing Operations.35 Our results
indicate that changing the cost paid by banks to fund commercial lending is an e↵ec-
tive policy lever to induce credit expansion to SMEs in crises. This is in contrast to
central-bank-supplied liquidity not tied to lending that has been found to be largely
ine↵ective at expanding lending to firms in other countries (e.g. Iyer et al. (2014)),
35The TLTRO allowed banks to borrow funds to lend to households and companies. Banks could
borrow up to 7% of their loans to companies and individuals (excluding mortgages). See Eichengreen
(2015) for more details. The Bank of Japan implemented a similar policy to the ACC in 2009 and
2010.
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or only of benefit to the largest firms (e.g. Andrade et al. (2015)). The e cacy of
a policy that induces banks to increase lending to existing borrowers also challenges
the general argument that lowering the cost of funds would be unlikely to compensate
banks for the high risk of borrower default (e.g. Eichengreen (2015)).
To our knowledge, we are the first to provide clear evidence on SME credit expansions
in crisis periods, and particularly how banks expand their lending portfolios in times
of financial crisis. We also provide evidence that firms with only one bank relationship
are particularly a↵ected by bank credit contractions, highlighting a disadvantage to
the archetypal close banking relationship that only manifests in crisis periods.
The shock that we exploit provides an unusually valuable opportunity to uncover how
banks adjust their lending to firms in crisis periods, and to explore a successful lever
to generate a credit expansion during an aggregrate contraction – a topic of crucial
importance for policy. In February 2012 the Banque de France (BdF) changed which
commercial loans could be used as collateral by banks in borrowing from the BdF -
they reduced the minimum credit rating required of the borrower for the loan to be
eligible collateral by one notch. This means that the shock creates clear treatment
and control groups: firms in the two credit ratings on either side of the new eligibility
threshold. Both groups are closely comparable: they have similar credit ratings and
very clear common trends in ex ante credit growth.
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E↵ect dominated by single-bank firms
Thus, the natural experiment we exploit operates at the firm–credit rating level,
allowing us to examine the e↵ect of a change in the cost of bank funds on lending for
all SMEs in the nearby credit rating categories. By contrast, the influential literature
on shocks to bank liquidity largely excludes firms with only one bank relationship
from their sample for econometric reasons.36
One should expect a di↵erence in the e↵ect of the shock we consider on multi-bank
firms versus single bank firms: firstly single-bank firms are unavoidably exposed to any
shock a↵ecting their lender and thus more likely to be constrained in a crisis period
(Detragiache et al. (2000)). Secondly the banks of one bank firms have hold up power
over their borrowers (especially during crises when switching is particularly di cult),
and so may take advantage of it to charge higher rates (Santos and Winton (2008)) or
instead choose to protect these rents for the future by providing additional funding
in these periods (Bolton et al. (2013)).37 Which e↵ect dominates is an empirical
question.
36Namely, use of the within-firm estimator to control for firm demand, together with a bank-level
shock. For example, see Gan (2007), Schnabl (2012), and Iyer et al. (2014). Khwaja and Mian
(2008) are an exception: their main results focus on firms with more than one bank but they also
consider the e↵ects of their bank shock on all firms, arguing that those estimates are a lower bound
on the real e↵ects. Paravisini (2008) also examines a sample including single bank firms, but finds
larger lending e↵ects for firms with multiple banks, and cautions that his results are for “normal
times,” as opposed to a crisis period.
37The literature provides some support for looking separately at single bank firms. In the Detra-
giache et al. (2000) model, firms choose between two regimes: single or multiple banking, largely
based on the probability of a bank liquidity shock which causes premature liquidation. Petersen
and Rajan (1994) report that in the cross section additional bank relationships are associated with
higher interest rates and lower credit availability, and that strong relationships may provide an “in-
formational monopoly, so that cost reductions are not passed on to the firm” but instead manifest
as quantity changes (p35). Houston and James (1996) also find di↵erences in debt behavior between
single and multi-bank firms in a sample of public firms.
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Our central result is precisely that the firms excluded from the bank shock literature
– firms with only one bank relationship – that are most a↵ected by a drop in the
cost of funds for lending. We find a 7% increase in debt for single bank firms, and
a 2.5% increase for 2 and 3 bank firms. Single bank firms are younger and smaller
than multibank firms, are a large fraction of the firm population (making up 83% of
firms in France), and employ a large part of the workforce (⇠38% of private sector
workforce in France), which makes enhanced credit access for such firms likely to have
material e↵ects both on innovation and economic activity more broadly. 38
Which single-bank firms are most a↵ected?
Not all single bank firms are equally a↵ected by the reduced cost of funding loans.
Banks adjust their lending portfolio as existing loans mature or as firms request
credit – our shock provides a window into this process. We find that additional credit
flows on average to firms with stronger observables: firms with lower leverage, older
firms, and firms that are net providers of trade credit (rather than users). We find
no evidence of loan ever-greening: the e↵ects of the shock do not vary with proxies
for size, interest coverage or profitability in our sample. High-growth firms also see
especially large increases in their debt growth (of 15 to 30 percentage points) relative
to ineligible high-growth firms, and while the e↵ect is especially pronounced for single
bank firms, it is also present for multi-bank borrowers. Because high growth firms
38In 2008, 83% of the population of French firms – including micro firms – had a single-bank
relationship. This number is highly correlated with firm size with 86% of micro firms, 39% of SMEs
and 21% of large firms had only one bank relationship (Banque de France, 2010). The employment
figure is an approximation based on the percentages of single-bank firms by size category (large,
SMEs and micro firms) and by number of employees in each private sector category in France in
2012. (Insee, 2012)
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generally have high credit demand, this di↵erential e↵ect provides evidence consistent
with these firms being credit constrained ex ante.
Bank relationships provide some benefit within single bank firms
The banks of firms with a single relationship are particularly likely to have developed
the relationship, given the reduced scope for information externalities benefiting other
banks, or strategic default behavior by borrowers. Thus, single bank firms with a well-
established banking relationship would be most likely to see their lending increase
(see for example Petersen and Rajan, 1994). We find evidence that banks value
soft information acquired in a banking relationship: firms which maintain both long
relationship and information intensive relationships - by engaging in a wider range of
transactions with their bank – see their debt respond more to the positive shock.
We next consider whether richer relationships are a substitute for or a complement
to firm observables such as leverage, age and net provision of trade credit. We find
suggestive evidence that relationships substitute for such observables. Single bank
firms with a wider range of transactions do not see any additional credit if their
observables suggest they are better borrowers. By contrast, firms without a wide
range of transactions with the bank show a heterogeneity of e↵ect associated with
standard observables: firms receive more credit if they have low leverage, are older,
or are net providers of trade credit. In short, it seems that richer bank relationships
are valuable for single bank firms. 39
39In unpublished results we do not find similar quantity e↵ects of banking relationships for multi-
bank firms, even when looking at their main bank. As the overall e↵ect of the ACC reform is weaker
for multibank borrowers this may be because of low power. Alternatively, it could suggest that
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Payment default
Our final finding is that firms that are eligible for the ACC framework are 0.6% less
likely to default on payments to their suppliers than non eligible firms, in the two years
following the shock. This reduced rate of default actually begins to have a detectable
e↵ect only six months following the shock, at which point the reduced probability of
a default event is over 1 percent relative to ineligible firms. Overall, the finding that
the fall in the cost of bank funds causally reduced defaults to suppliers suggests that
bank belt tightening may itself induce defaults in borrowers that propagate through
their supplier networks in crisis periods. The evidence is consistent with Boissay and
Gropp (2013), who show credit constrained firms pass on adverse liquidity shocks by
defaulting on their suppliers.
Single-bank firms are on a much more negative time trend ex ante, and
the trends are not a↵ected by shock
So far we have focused on di↵erences within the single bank category across treatment
and control groups, rather than comparing single bank firms to those with multiple
bank relationships. This is because firms with only one banking relationship are very
likely to di↵er from those with multiple banks on unobservable dimensions as well as
on observables. However, some comparison of the e↵ects of the shock across these
categories is warranted, with the caveat that we can no longer be confident that these
di↵erences are causal.
information externalities when a firm has multiple borrowers are such that relationships are less
valuable (Rajan, 1992), and so adjustments may occur more on the price than the quantity margin
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
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We find a striking di↵erence in the time trends in bank lending to single versus mul-
tiple bank firms: the former have consistently negative average debt growth in the
four year period we examine (2010-2013), while for multiple bank firms debt growth
is stable or increasing. Moreover, the di↵erential time-trends are largely una↵ected
by a change in the cost of bank lending, suggesting a deeper di↵erence in how these
borrowers are viewed by banks, despite having identical credit ratings. This is con-
sistent with Detragiache et al. (2000) which present multiple bank relationships as an
insurance mechanism against bank liquidity shocks. 40
Generally, single-bank firms look more credit constrained ex ante
Additional evidence points to single bank firms being more credit constrained than
firms with multiple bank relationships, although the evidence for this is suggestive,
not causal. Single bank firms’ debt increases much more in response to the reduction
in bank funding cost, as described earlier. The total amount lent to the single bank
firms in the sample also declines steadily over time, suggesting banks are not rolling
over the debt of single-bank firms in this period.41 These patterns do not hold for
multi-bank firms. Further, only 29% of single bank firms have undrawn credit lines
worth over five percent of their debt stock in 2011, while 50% of multi-bank firms
have such lines.
We provide additional evidence for the presence of financing constraints for single-
40They model the firm’s likelihood of choosing to have only one bank as increasing in profits, bank
recovery rate after default, and the probability of an idiosyncratic bank liquidity shock – single bank
firms are forced to prematurely liquidate if their bank is hit by a shock.
41Only 14% of single bank firms see their debt grow by over ten percent month on month in the
pre-period (2011) in comparison to 23% of multibank firms, which is consistent with single bank
firms being less likely to have their debt rolled over when it is nearing maturity.
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bank firms by testing the e↵ect of the ACC on a sample of firms that have ex-ante
high demand. We construct a measure of firm demand by looking at a subsample
of firms that saw a high number of non-trivial debt increases in the year preceding
the shock. Single bank firms in the top quartile of this measure see especially large
di↵erential increases in lending in response to the shock (⇠ 20 percent) and this
is even greater (⇠ 30 percent) for smaller firms, which are generally believed to
be more opaque. Interestingly, we find no response in the debt of multibank firms
to this measure di↵erentially across the eligible (treatment) and ineligible (control)
groups, suggesting that high demand firms with several banks did not need the ACC
framework to obtain more lending, and so are likely less financially constrained.
Implications of single bank firm credit constraints for policy and literature
If single bank firms are indeed more credit constrained than multi-bank firms in bad
times, this has implications both for policy and for the academic literature. Firstly,
policies to induce bank lending to firms may be more e↵ective if oriented towards
them in bad times, especially given the potentially contagion-reducing e↵ects via
reduced supplier non-payment reported here. Of course, it is unclear whether such
policies are welfare enhancing overall, but they appear to be consistently popular with
policymakers. Secondly, the view in the empirical literature on relationship banking
that fewer and stronger relationships lead to better access, weakly lower prices and
lower collateral requirements may need a caveat: having only one bank relationship
may be very disadvantageous in crisis periods. In the light of the evidence on the
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bank lending channel – that the real e↵ects of aggregate shocks (or bank specific
shocks) can be aggravated by the financial constraints of banks –single bank firms
may be particularly vulnerable to shocks to their bank, as in the Detragiache et al.
(2000) model.
A recent stream of papers focusing on the role of relationship banks during recessions
has found mixed evidence, with some papers finding a protective role for relationships
(Bolton et al. (2013); Deyoung et al. (2015)), while others find limited e↵ects or even
the opposite (Jiménez et al. (2014); Santos and Winton (2008)). While directly rele-
vant to our finding that single bank firms, with their deeper relationships, seem to be
at a disadvantage in recessions, these papers cannot distinguish the di↵erent dynamics
of single bank lending during recessions from that of multi-bank firms because of their
data or empirical strategies. In an important paper, Bolton et al. (2013) find that
relationship banks (identified by low distance from their borrowers’ headquarters)
in Italy provide continuation financing for their borrowers in crisis periods, unlike
transaction banks. However, for econometric reasons this study focuses exclusively
on firms with more than one banking relationship.42 Similarly, Deyoung et al. (2015),
find that a small subset of relationship-focused US community banks increased their
lending to SMEs during the financial crisis, unlike the majority of banks. But their
data is aggregated at the bank level, and so presents an average across firms with all
numbers of bank relationships.
In contrast to these results suggesting a positive role for relationships in crisis peri-
42Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010)and Sette and Gobbi (2015) find protective results and also
focus exclusively on multi-bank borrowers.
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ods, Jiménez et al. (2014) find that Spanish banks are more likely to approve loan
applications from new borrowers when they had a working relationship with the bor-
rower in the past , but the e↵ect is small and they find no di↵erential e↵ect of lending
relationship over the cycle. Further, Santos and Winton (2008) report that banks in
recessions opportunistically raise interest rates by more than is justified by risk alone,
exploiting the hold-up power generated by the relationship. However, their data is
for large firms only: listed corporations and syndicated loan users that have ready
access to non-bank finance, making it di cult to apply to SMEs.
Using loan applications data for new borrowers, Jiménez et al. (2014) compare the
relative importance of the bank and firm lending channels over the cycle. While they
o↵er evidence that firm balance-sheet strength matters, in crisis and in good times, for
building new lending relationships (extensive margin of the balance sheet channel),
we investigate the intensive margin. We o↵er new evidence on heterogeneous e↵ects
of the firm-lending channel for existing borrowers conditional on the structure of in-
formation available to lenders (i.e. monopoly vs. shared information). Investigating
the intensive margin is more appropriate for us, as our research question focuses on
the use of information by banks in their loan portfolio allocation decisions. We are
thus able to explore heterogeneity of the e↵ects of our shock along di↵erent charac-
teristics of the bank lending relationship for existing relationships and we show how
the interaction between soft and hard information di↵erentially a↵ect loans renewal
decisions and how soft information sometimes dominates firm balance sheet strength.
More generally, this paper relates to the vast literature on the bank-lending channel.
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Extensive evidence supports the view that banks pass on monetary policy tightening
(e.g. Kashyap et al. (1993, 1994);Jiménez et al. (2012)) 43 and unexpected liquidity
shocks (Peek and Rosengren (2000); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Chava and Purnanan-
dam (2011); Schnabl (2012)) to their borrowers. Much less is known however about
adjustments to positive liquidity shocks and in particular, of highest interest from a
policy perspective, about how expansions work in periods of aggregate contraction,
the focus of this paper.44
This paper also contributes to the literature on the real e↵ects of the lending channel,
which analyses how firm level outcomes are a↵ected by bank supply shocks.45 To
our knowledge we are the first to show how positive liquidity shocks in crisis periods
create real benefits in the form of positive spillovers to firm suppliers.
From a policy perspective, a firm-level focus is critical to assess the policy e↵ectiveness
and its distributional e↵ects, as loan level e↵ects can be o↵set by firm-level adjust-
ments when firms have multiple lenders (Jimenez et al. (2014)).46 Interestingly our
43Jiménez et al. (2012)analyze the extensive margin of lending with loan applications data and
o↵er micro-based evidence of an operative bank-lending channel, which varies with the strength of
bank balance sheet (capital and liquidity).
44Paravisini (2008)examines a lending program in Argentina to support lending to SMEs in poorer
regions. The expansion in available external finance had a substantial positive e↵ect on the credit
supply of constrained banks, but cautions that the reported e↵ects are for good times. For France,
Andrade et al. (2015) find evidence that the ECB long-term refinancing operations (LTROs) imple-
mented by the ECB in 2011 and 2012 had a combined positive and significant impact on the overall
net credit supply to large borrowers.
45The literature typically finds that real economic activity such as firm investment and inventory
decisions (Kashyap et al. (1993, 1994); Chava and Purnanandam (2011)), firm investment compo-
sition (Garicano and Steinwender (2015)), as well as firm employment decisions (Greenstone et al.
(2014); Chodorow-Reich (2014)) are significantly negatively a↵ected by tight monetary policy or
exogenous negative shocks to credit supply.
46Jimenez et al. (2014)find a positive loan-level e↵ect of the positive credit supply shock induced
by increased access to securitization in Spain in 2004-2007, but no e↵ect at the aggregate firm level
and no real e↵ects on sales or employment, suggesting that firms take advantage of improved terms
of credit to reduce their interest burden but not to increase liabilities overall.
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paper o↵ers also a way to look at those borrowers who are unable to undo the bank
lending shocks : the smallest firms (Khwaja and Mian (2008); Iyer et al. (2014)).
2.2 The Additional Credit Claim reform
2.2.1 The Additional Credit Claim framework
All borrowing by banks from the Eurosystem (credit operations such as open mar-
ket operations, use of the marginal lending facility and intraday credit) needs to be
secured with eligible collateral. The Eurosystem allows banks to pledge marketable
47 and non-marketable securities as collateral in its credit operations (Tamura and
Tabakis (2013) ). The minimum credit quality requirement for eligible credit claims
(i.e. bank loans) is equivalent to a rating of 4+ in the Banque de France’s rat-
ing scale,48 or a long-term rating of BBB-/Baa3 from S&P/Moody’s. Collateral is
pledged by a borrowing bank at a national central bank and enters a borrower-specific
pool of collateral against which it can borrow from the Eurosystem (collateral is not
47Marketable assets consist in marketable debt instruments complying with the eligibility criteria
defined by the Eurosystem-wide eligibility rules, known as the “General Framework”. e.g. Central
government or central bank debt instruments, Covered bank bonds, Bank and corporate debt instru-
ments, Asset-backed securities. Bank loans to high credit quality firms are eligible non-marketable
securities.
48The Banque de France assigns credit ratings to all French non-financial companies with a mini-
mum turnover of 0.75 million and accounting statements. The rating reflects the overall assessment
of firms ability to meet their financial commitments at a three-year horizon, and is used as to select
the loans that banks are allowed to use as collateral for their refinancing with the Eurosystem. Rat-
ings are based on firms’ accounting statements, as well as information on supplier/customer trade
bill payment incidents, bank loans reported by credit institutions, and legal information as well as
other sources. Firms are broken down into the following classes by default probability:3++ (high-
est), 3+, 3, 4+, 4, 5+, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 to P (in bankruptcy). The Banque de France does not receive any
payment from rated companies and always informs companies of their rating, although the rating is
not public. Finally, the rating is reviewed at least yearly after receipt of firm financial statements,
and whenever a significant new development is brought to the attention of the Banque de France.
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tied to a specific operation)49.
In response to a liquidity crisis in the Eurozone interbank funding market in 2011 and
as part of a broader set of non-standard monetary policy measures to improve liquidity
the ECB allowed National Central Banks to accept additional credit claims (ACC) as
collateral on December 8th 2011. The ECB also implemented two so-called long-term
refinancing operations (LTROs) with 3 year maturities. The first LTRO took place
on 21 December 2011, before the implementation of the ACC framework. The second
operation took place on 29 February 2012, after the French ACC framework was
approved. . On February 9th 2012, the ECB approved the criteria proposed by seven
national central banks 50, including the Banque de France, for the implementation of
the ACC framework, which is temporary, but has been extended to at least September
2018. The Banque de France implementation of the ACC lowered the minimum
eligible credit rating from 4+ to 4 (corresponding to a maximum probability of default
of 1% at one year) and extended the framework to new categories such as stand-alone
guaranteed mortgages.51
2.2.2 Estimating the size of the ACC shock
The total value (after haircuts) of the collateral pledged with the Banque de France
by 54 banks at the end of 2011 was 412.8 billion (22% of total value of collateral
pledged with the Eurosystem), among which credit claims represented 36% or 150
49Since October 2008 no quantity restrictions apply to Eurosystem open market operations if the
borrower provides su cient collateral.
50Approved Central Banks are Central Bank of Ireland, Banco de Espana, Banque de France,
Banca d’Italia, Central Bank of Cyprus, Oesterreichische Nationalbank and Banco de Portugal.
51See: Eligibility Criteria regarding Additional Credit Claims. https://www.banque-
france.fr/uploads/tx bdfgrandesdates/2012-02-9-eligibility.pdf
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billion (Bignon et al. (2016) - See table ?? in Appendix). In France, the ACC reform
made available an additional pool of corporate credit claim collateral of about 90
billion (total outstanding amount of loans that became eligible in February 2012),
which, according to Bignon et al. (2016) corresponds to an individual collateral shock
for French banks that could have represented 4.8% to 15.1% of their drawn credits.
In practice the use of the ACC was more limited for corporate credit claims (20%
of pledged ACC loans for total of 9 billion after applying the haircut schedules
specified in the French ACC framework) than for stand-alone residential mortgages
made eligible at the same period.52
Our estimate for the size of the fall in the cost of funding for banks when the ACC
program launched is the spread between the Euribor-12month rate interbank borrow-
ing rate, and the ECB main refinancing rate at which banks could obtain loans using
the newly eligible collateral. The Euribor-12month was 1.5% on average in March
2012 and the main refinancing rate was 1%, so the spread was 50 basis points. We
have not been able to improve on this back-of-the-envelope calculation, as there are
several di culties in estimating the true market cost of funding for French banks.
Firstly, we do not know the maturity of the loans against which the ACC claims are
pledged and this information is hard to obtain, as collateral is not tied to a specific
operation. The maturity at which banks can borrow from the Eurosystem ranges
from three years (the second VLTRO which occurred at the same time as the ACC
introduction) to one week. Secondly, the Euribor benchmark that we are using as the
52Haircuts vary from 17% to 65% depending on the characteristics of the loans. See :
https://www.banque france.fr/fileadmin/user upload/banque de france/Eurosysteme et international/cp-
20130718-bce-reexamine-son-dispositif-de-controle-des-risques.pdf
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market borrowing rate is a eurowide reported interest rate; thus it is not an observed
rate, nor is it specific to French banks (Anecdotal evidence suggests that French banks
were participating in the interbank market in this time, while banks from euro area
periphery countries were not.) Thirdly, interbank rates reflect rates for unsecured
lending, while the ECB refinancing rate is secured (albeit with collateral that cannot
be used in any other contexts). Finally, since October 2008, refinancing operations
with the Eurosystem were on a full allotment basis and at a fixed rate. By contrast,
interbank market rates vary with the risk profile of the borrower and with supply and
demand conditions, making it likely that borrowing large amounts would push actual
rates beyond Euribor levels.
Over the course of 2012 the Euribor-OIS spread fell, following the massive injections
of liquidity by the ECB; by the end of 2012 it seems clear that the advantage of the
ACC as a source of below-market-cost funding had largely disappeared. Thus, the
shock we exploit lasts, at most, for ten months (February-December 2012).
2.3 Empirical challenges and identification strategy
2.3.1 Identification strategy
We investigate the causal e↵ects of a positive credit supply shock on treated firms
and closely comparable non-treated firms to show how bank changed their lending
portfolio during the crisis. While the collateral reform was not targeted at small firms
in particular, we restrict our attention to SMEs so as to provide new insights about
the availability of credit for the most opaque, and thus likely the most constrained
118
firms, and more particularly on single-bank borrowers.
As illustrated by figure 2.1, our empirical strategy exploits the fact that the new col-
lateral framework reduced the costs to banks of lending to some types of SMEs (firms
rated 4) - by lowering refinancing costs for loans to the newly eligible counterparts -,
but not to others that are closely comparable (firms rated 5+). Using firms whose
loans are ineligible to be pledged as collateral as our control group, we focus on the be-
havior of newly eligible firms before and after 2012 to provide di↵erence-in-di↵erences
estimates of the impact of the program on various firm-level outcomes.
France provides an ideal setting for this study as this is a banking economy and we
use a sample of SMEs which are typically bank dependent. In our sample less than
1% of the firms have access to public debt markets so that they were not able to
substitute bank debt by increased bond financing. We focus especially on single-bank
firms as they are entirely exposed to any liquidity shock to their bank (Detragiache
et al. (2000)) and cannot counterbalance it by accessing funds from other banks.
Furthermore their lender has an informational monopoly and this private information
is not observable by other banks so that the cost of switching to a new lender is
potentially very high, specially during crises.
Our main empirical challenge is to isolate supply e↵ects from credit demand and busi-
ness cycles e↵ects in a time of crisis. We overcome these hurdles by taking advantage
of the great features of the ACC shock, which varies at the firm (rating) level, and
of the richness of our individual firm credit data, available at a monthly frequency in
the French Credit Register. To overcome the demand/supply identification challenge,
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the literature on the bank-lending channel typically look at cross-sectional di↵erences
in bank responses to common liquidity shocks (e.g. Kashyap et al. (1994); Kashyap
and Stein (2000)) or they restrict their attention to firms that have at least two
banking relationships, which allows the empiricist to control for unobservable firm
loan demand (Gan (2007); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Andrade et al. (2015); Schnabl
(2012)). This means that the e↵ects on SMEs, which generally have a single banking
relationship, have not been well established.
On the contrary, our paper exploits a positive supply shock, the ACC reform of
January 2012, which varies at the firm level (rating level) and not at the bank level.
Our strategy has several advantages. First, it means that the economic interpreta-
tion is more direct, because banks’ response to the shock likely reflects their normal
adjustment process to a change in the cost of funds in recession periods, rather than
the more disordered reaction of banks to emergency conditions generated by large
unexpected liquidity shocks. Second, the shock is not vulnerable to concerns raised
by Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Paravisini (2008) regarding the within firm estima-
tor: in particular, that banks respond di↵erently, and that this response is correlated
with the bank-level shock in some way. Third we do not exclude single-bank firms,
which have typically been ignored in the existing literature. Finally we can study
firm-level outcomes (and not firm*bank level) as our identification strategy does not
rely on variations in shocks to bank finance within firms but comes from variations
in the cross-section of firms, within a common lender. Looking at the firm level is
critical to assess whether and how lending shocks are transmitted to the economy.
120
Indeed, loan level results can be misleading as the loan-level bank-lending channel
can be undone by firm-level adjustments of multibank firms, which reallocate their
borrowing portfolio across banks to take advantage of improved terms of credit and
reduce their interest burden but without increasing liabilities overall (Jimenez et al.
(2014)).
No di↵erential trends unrelated to credit availability
We use a triple di↵erence approach in the spirit of Banerjee and Duflo (2013). We
focus on the change in the growth rate in firm drawn debt, before and after the reform
for newly eligible firms (ACC) and for non eligible firms in the closest credit rating
bucket (Rating 5+).
[ insert Figure 2.1 ]
Our main identification assumption is that treated and untreated firms share similar
trends and that their credit trend does not systematically di↵er around the reform
period apart from the e↵ect of the reform. Figures 2.2, 2.7 and 2.8show the average
growth rate in debt for treated and untreated firms in the whole population.
Control firms look similar to treatment firms in terms of their growth rate in debt
prior to the reform. The treated and control groups follow parallel trends prior to
the reform and diverge at the time of the reform. We then separate our sample
between single-bank and multibank firms. The growth rate in drawn credit of treated
firms rises following the introduction of the ACC, most particularly in the single-bank
subsample (figure 2.7).
121
[ insert Figure 2.2 ]
[ insert Figure 2.7 ]
[ insert Figure 2.8 ]
We confirm the parallel trend assumption more rigorously in a regression set up,
where we interact the treatment dummy with a time trend in the pre-treatment
period. Table 2.3 reports the results of this test. Single-bank ACC firms do not show
any evidence of a di↵erential pre-trend in debt growth. For multibank however we
reject the null hypotheses that the coe cient estimate of the trend is zero with a
much narrower margin, looking at the one-year period before the reform.
[ insert Table 2.3 ]
Exogeneity of rating, mixing between treatment and control groups and
attenuation bias
We estimate an Intention-To-Treat e↵ect based on the rating of the firm that makes
it eligible to treatment but we do not observe firms that are actually treated or not
treated i.e. whose loans are pledged or unpledged.
We can rule out selection bias as treatment is based on the Banque de France internal
credit rating, which is exogenously set by the Central Bank. One could still be
concerned of a possible change in the attribution criteria of ratings after the ACC -
for example making it more di cult to get a rating of 4 - so that increased credit
availability for this category of firms after the ACC would reflect a composition e↵ect
and a change in the quality of firms rated 4. To address this issue, and also because
122
after February 2012 rating becomes endogenous to treatment and can directly be
a↵ected by enhanced or restricted access to extra credit, the composition of our
treatment and control groups is based on firm rating before the ACC date (January
2012).53
The drawback of this approach is that firm rating varies over time and firms can get
downgraded or upgraded in the post-treatment period. As a result we have some
mixing between our treatment group and our control group, which creates some type
I and type II errors. This is true both in the pre and post treatment periods. The
stronger the bias in our estimates the further away we go from the ACC date (February
2012). Looking at the occurrences of rating downgrade and upgrade over time in the
year after the ACC reform we show that we actually face an attenuation bias.
[ insert Figure 2.5 ]
[ insert Figure 2.6 ]
As shown by figure 2.5, after one year about 20% of firms that were initially rated 4
have been downgraded at least once and have not been eligible to treatment for at least
one month. By considering them as part of the treated group we underestimate our
intention to treat e↵ect. Symmetrically, about 25% of 5+ firms have been upgraded
at least once over the year following the ACC (see figure 2.6). As a result they are
eligible to treatment while we are considering them as controls. By considering them
as part of the control group we underestimate our intention to treat e↵ect.




















i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank
firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes quarters. Bank
kt
is a (main) bank x
month fixed e↵ects. The sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or
“ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers
on the internal credit risk rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent




One di culty in using our data is that we do not observe new loans but only monthly
outstanding amounts of credit. To proxy for new credit we thus look at the growth rate
in outstanding amounts. Because a large part of changes in credit outstanding amount
is driven by periodic amortization of the debt, monthly growth rates are too volatile
and noisy to isolate significant changes. We thus use a cumulative growth measure.
We measure the growth rate in debt g
ijkt
for firm i banking with main bank k in month





ijk2011s1)/Eijkt where Eijkt = 0.5 ⇤ (Dijkt + D̄ijk2011s1),
where D
ijkt
is the outstanding amount of drawn credit (short-term bank credit and
long-term loans) in month t for firm i borrowing from bank k .D̄
ijk2011s1 is the average
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level of debt of firm i in the first 6 months of 2011.54
Our growth rate measure is inspired by the labor literature analyzing establishment
and firm dynamics (See Davis et al. (1996)) and is bounded between -2 and +2. Since
we use a cumulative growth measure it is not symmetric around zero but still smooths
the distribution a lot compared to a traditional growth rate measure. Taking the last
6 months of 2011 or year 2010 as period of reference does not a↵ect our results (cf.
robustness table 2.15 in Appendix). Using a traditional cumulative growth rate does
not change our conclusions either but give larger coe cient estimates due to a small
borrower e↵ect as small credit exposures tend to be much more volatile than large
ones.
The 1
ACCi dummy takes a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January
2012 and zero otherwise. Post
t
is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in each
month after February 2012. Our parameter of interest is   , the estimated intent-to-
treat (ITT) e↵ect of the reduction in bank funding costs induced by ACC, on a sample
of newly eligible borrowers. The OLS estimate of   is an unbiased estimate of the
ITT e↵ect under the parallel trend assumption that changes in firm borrowings over
time would have been identical in both treatment and control groups in the absence
of the ACC.





try*quarter fixed e↵ects (Ind
jT
). Firm fixed e↵ects remove the average di↵erence
in credit growth between ACC and 5+ firms and allows us to control for unobserved
54When the firm drawn credit amount reaches zero for the second consecutive month we replace
our growth measure with a missing so that it does not get stuck to -2. We also exclude firms with
0 debt in the first semester of 2011 to avoid having some obervations always set to +2.
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(time-invariant) firm fundamentals that proxy for credit demand. Though risk or
investment opportunities may vary over time our estimation period is limited to two
years so that it should not be a main concern. Furthermore for demand factors to
alter our estimates, one would have to believe that demand changes are occurring in
our sample in a way that is systematically di↵erent across both rating groups, even
after taking out the e↵ect of bank time-variant heterogeneity and of macroeconomic
fluctuations at the industry level.
Given our short period of estimation, one year before and one year after the ACC,
we do not include firm-specific control variables such as size, age and financial state-
ment variables as they are annual variables and almost all their explanatory power is
absorbed by our firm fixed e↵ect.
We fully account for both observed and unobserved time-varying bank heterogeneity
by saturating the specifications with bank * month fixed e↵ects. For multibank firms
the fixed e↵ect is defined with respect to their main lender. The average share of bor-
rowings from main bank in the total firm drawn credit is 78% in 2011. Identification
comes from comparing the changes in lending in the same period by the same bank
to firms of di↵erent rating.
As mentioned previously the implementation of the ACC reform was concurrent with
exceptional extra liquidity supplied by the Central Bank (second VLTRO) and thus
made available for lending to newly eligible borrower (4-rated firms) after February
2012. As a result, at the beginning of our post-treatment period, the comparison of
newly eligible (rating 4) vs. non-eligible firms (rating 5+) captures the joint e↵ect
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of the LTRO and of the ACC but is not driven by the di↵erences between banks in
terms of VLTRO intakes (because of bank*month fixed e↵ects). Within the same
bank, there is no obvious reason why VLTROs should di↵erentially a↵ect 4-rated
borrowers and 5+-rated borrowers but for the ACC. Bank*month fixed e↵ects also
absorb heterogeneity in bank responses to the ECB announcement of outright open
market operations (OMTs) in August 2012.55
Finally we control for any trends that might a↵ect the French economy at the industry
level by including industry*quarter fixed e↵ects.
We cluster the standard errors at the firm level to address auto-correlation issues
(Bertrand et al. (2004)).
In a second time, to investigate dynamic of the e↵ect over time we extend our sample
period from 2010 to 2013 and saturate our model with interactions of the ACC e↵ect
and of monthly dummies in each months but the first 12 months of our estimation
period. We estimate a  
t
for each time period to follow the monthly dynamic of the
e↵ect of the ACC reform on lending to single-bank SMEs. The estimated equation is











ACCi ⇥ t+Bankkt + IndjT + ✏ijkt (2.2)
55Acharya et al. 2015, show that OMT program announcement led to an increase in bank health
and in turn that banks with improved health increase credit supply to low quality borrower. Bank
sensibility to OMT depends on how exposed to Sovereign Debt in Portugal, Spain and Greece they
were.
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2.4 Data and Summary Statistics
2.4.1 Data description and sample composition
This study considers a sample of independent (one legal unit) Small and Medium
Size Enterprises (SMEs)56. For the sake of our identification strategy we restrict
our attention to SMEs with a rating of 4 and 5+ on the internal rating scale of
the Banque de France. The data spans a period between 2010 and 2013. The level
of observation in our data is a unique firm x month combination, for firms having
some positive bank debt over the period 2011-2012. Our primary data sources are
the French national credit register (monthly data on outstanding amount of bank
credit), available at the Banque de France, the FIBEN individual company database
(yearly financial statement data) and the FIBEN internal credit rating database of
the Banque de France.
Firm-level credit rating
For the purpose of this paper, we assign firms in our treatment or control groups
based on their rating57 in January 201258. To this end we select firms with an active
56SMEs are defined by the French Law of Modernization of the Economy (LME) of 2008. SMEs
are firms with less than 250 employees, an annual turnover of less than EUR 50 million and balance
sheet assets totaling less than EUR 43 million.
57The French Central Bank attributes credit ratings to a large number of resident non-financial
firms. Around 270,000 companies (of which over 4,700 groups assessed on the basis of their con-
solidated accounts) are rated in this manner. Financial products are not rated; ratings are not
made available to the public. Credit ratings are used by commercial banks to evaluate whether a
firm’s bank debt is eligible to refinancing operations for Eurosystem monetary policy operations.
The rating is an overall assessment of a company’s ability to meet its financial commitments over a
three-year horizon, based on its financial statements as well as on qualitative information. Rating
information is updated on a daily basis, should an incident impact the firm’s ability to meet its finan-
cial commitments, or on a yearly basis for the annual review, provided firm accounting information
is made available to the Central Bank.
58Results are robust to selecting control and treatment groups based on November 2011 or De-
cember 2011 ratings.
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credit rating over the period of interest (2010-2013). We exclude firms with inactive
ratings i.e. firms whose financial information has not been updated since 23 months
or more and we require each borrower to have a credit rating of either 4 (newly eligible
to be pledged as collateral under the ACC i.e. treated firms), or 5+ (closest rating
category, one notch below, for non eligible firms i.e. control firms).
A rating of 4 corresponds to a 1% probability of default at a 1-year horizon. Firms in
these three rating categories represent about 50% of the total sample of SMEs with
an active credit rating as of January 2012, with 22.1% having a rating of 4 (ACC),
12.6% a rating of 5+ (one notch below) and 15.6% a rating of 4+ (one notch above).
Because we cannot require firms to stay in their rating category after the ACC date,
as rating becomes endogenous to treatment, there is some mixing between our control
and treatment groups as firms get upgraded and downgraded after February 2012.
We have shown in the previous section it creates an attenuation bias of our policy
e↵ect.
Firm accounting data
This study considers a sample of independent (one legal unit) SMEs. Independent
SMEs59 are identified using Banque de France available information on firm financial
linkages (structure of ownership). We restrict our attention to independent SMEs to
avoid any double-counting issues in the financial statements60 and to exclude e↵ects
coming from intra-firm liquidity flows between holdings and SME subsidiaries. This
59SMEs that do not belong to a group and are mono legal entity.
60We are using financial statement information and bank-firm credit data that are reported at the
legal unit level and are not consolidated.
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way we also make sure mergers, divestitures or acquisitions e↵ects do not a↵ect our
results. Accounting data comes from FIBEN, a Banque de France database, which
is based on fiscal documents.61We exclude micro-firms62 from our sample as well as
agriculture, financials, utilities and public sector firms. We also eliminate firms with
special legal status and only keep limited liability firms i.e. SA and SARL, which
make 97% of our selected SME sample. We drop firms with negative debt, negative
or zero total assets and missing number of employees. We use firm size (log of total
assets or number of employees), age, leverage, tangible investment rate and trade
credit use as independent variables. All firm characteristics variables are winsorized
at the 0.5 th and 99.5 th percentiles throughout the analysis.
Firm-bank credit data
We merge yearly financial statement data with individual credit data from the French
national credit register (CCR)63 available at the Banque de France. CCR covers
extensively bank exposures to firms at the bank-firm level on a monthly basis. 64
61FIBEN includes all French firms which sales at least equal to EUR 75,000. In 2004, FIBEN
covered 80% of the firms with 20 to 500 employees, and 98% of those employing more than 500
employees.
62Under the LME definition micro-firms have less than 10 employees and sales and total assets
not exceeding EUR 2 million.
63Financial intermediaries, including all resident credit institutions, investment firms, and other
public institutions, have the legal obligation to report any risk exposure (e.g., credit claims) over
EUR 25,000 on a corporate counterpart as defined by a legal unit and referenced by a national
identification number (SIREN).
64“In practice, a significant methodological change regarding the scope of this reporting threshold
happened in April 2012. Before this date, a bank had to report its bilateral exposures larger than
EUR 25,000 as measured at the level of its local branches. After this date, a bank has to report
any bilateral exposure that is greater than EUR 25,000 as measured at the level of the whole
bank”Andrade et al. (2015). Following Andrade et al. (2015), we correct for this break by looking at
the information available at the bank branch-firm level. We dropped all bilateral branch-firm links
with a total exposure smaller than EUR 25,000 and then collapse this homogenized database at the
bank-firm level .
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Reporting statements are not limited to bank loans, they include undrawn credit
lines as well as guarantees, and specific operations (medium and long-term lease with
purchase option, factoring, securitized loans).
We first collapse exposures at the local bank branch (aggregating so-called “guichets”
exposures) to identify the main branch lender of a firm. Then we collapse credit
exposures at the level of banking groups (in French: GEAs, for “groupe economique
d’appartenance”) in order to assess the e↵ect of the ACC policy at the firm level and
not at the firm*bank level, since we are interested in the overall e↵ect of the policy.
Indeed firms with multiple bank relationship can react by adjusting their sources of
financing in equilibrium so that firm*bank level e↵ects are not informative of the
aggregate lending channel (Jimenez et al. (2014)). We use the word “bank” in the
rest of the paper to refer to banking group (GEA) and will specify local branch when
we refer to a finer level of granularity within lenders.
We require main banking groups to be present in the sample throughout the whole
period so as to make sure they are not a↵ected by bankruptcy, restructuration or
merger. Finally, an implicit requirement of the di↵erence-in-di↵erence strategy is
that the firms are present in the pre and post period. We thus require firms to
maintain a bank relationship from March 2011 to February 2013 i.e. one year before
and one year after the ACC reform. We analyze changes in the growth rate of drawn
credit at the firm x month level, over the period during which the firm has some
positive bank credit liability.
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Payment default data
Finally we use individual payment default data on trade bills coming from the CIPE
(Centrale des Incidents de Paiement), maintained by the Banque de France. The
CIPE database contains information related to all defaults on trade bills for all private
nonfinancial businesses that operate in France.65
In CIPE a ”default” is defined as a failure for a firm to pay, in time or in totality, its
trade creditors. Payment defaults are recorded on a daily basis. This data has been
used in other academic studies (Barrot (2016); Boissay and Gropp (2013); Aghion
et al. (2012)) and payment defaults have been shown to be negatively and significantly
correlated with a firm’s access to future loans (Aghion et al. (2012)).
About 2.5% of single-bank firms in our sample experience at least one payment in-
cident in 2011. Not all industries are concerned by payment incidents. Construction
and Trade have the highest default rates in our sample, while conversely, Services
and Real estate firms experience fewer payment incidents. When an incident on a
payment of a trade bill occurs, we have information on the identity of the supplier,
the customer, the amount of default, the due date of payment and the motive for the
non-payment (dispute, omission, illiquidity, or insolvency). We restrict our attention
to payment incidents triggered by insolvency issues (liquidation of the firm) or by
liquidity shortages leading a firm to, totally or partially, miss a payment to one of its
suppliers66.
65Banks have the legal obligation to report to the Central Bank any default on trade creditors
within four business days. CIPE receives and centralises declarations by credit institutions of trade
bill payment incidents and then made it available to all commercial banks.
66We exclude claim disputes with specified reasons but take into account failure to repay a trade
bill in totality under the alleged reason of a dispute.
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Results are robust to di↵erent definitions of default. Our default dependent variable
is a dummy variable equal to one when the firm has experienced at least one payment
incident during the month, and to zero otherwise.
2.4.2 Summary statistics
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics that compare treated (firms with a rating of
4) and control firms (firms with a rating of 5+) in the year prior to the reform (2011).
T-tests present the t statistic of a test of the di↵erence in means between the treated
and the control groups. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the overall sample,
while Panel B and C are restricted, respectively, to single-bank firms and multibank
firms.
Treatment and control firms
Overall SMEs in our sample are mature firms with a median age of 19 years and
median total assets of about 1300 thousand. The average firm employs around 20
employees, has about 400 thousand in drawn credit with a leverage ratio slightly
above 20%. It has 2 bank relationships and the length of its lending relationship with
its main lender is around 8 years. Finally it should be noted that less than 1% of the
firms in our sample has access to debt on financial markets (no bond financing). They
are thus pure bank financed firms. They are, however, very heterogeneous in terms
of their use of debt finance as the di↵erence between the average and the median of
total credit borrowed by these firms indicates, in all of the tables. Other sources of
external finance available for these firms include trade finance and leasing.
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Treated firms are significantly di↵erent from control firms in that they tend to be
a little bit younger, more leveraged, with a shorter maturity of their debt. Their
cumulative growth rate in debt with respect to the first semester of 2011 and measured
by g(Debt) as defined earlier, is not statistically di↵erent than the one of control
firms. Similar relationships hold when comparing treated and control firms within
the single-bank subsample or within the multibank subsample. The probability of
missing a payment on a trade bill (Payment default) is slightly higher in the control
group (5+ firms) than the default probability in the treatment group (ACC firms),
though this di↵erence does not hold within the single-bank subsample.
Single-bank and multibank firms
We define single-bank firms as firms borrowing from only one bank (banking group)
in 2011. N-bank firms borrow from more than N-1 bank and from less or N banks
on average in 2011. Within a banking group firms can borrow from several local
branches. We define as the main local branch, the branch whose average share of
loans to firm i in 2011 is the largest among firm i’s local lenders. A single-bank firm
can thus also have several local lenders (less than 10% do).
Main bank is the banking group whose average share of drawn credit to firm i is the
largest among firm i’s bank lenders in 2011. A total of 22 banking groups or standalone
banks, as identified by their GEA, appear in our sample in 2011 for single-bank firms.
The distribution of these groups’ market share of (drawn) corporate credit is very
skewed to the left and 9 banks represent 97 % of drawn credit in 2011 in our sample.
Figure 2.3 shows that on average, contrary to SMEs borrowing from multiple lenders,
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single-bank SMEs experienced a declining trend in their borrowings in 2011. The
average amount of outstanding credit granted to single-bank borrowers is downward
sloping while the trend is flat for 2-bank firms and positive for multibank firms with
more than 2 lenders.
[ insert Figure 2.3 ]
Panel D of table 1 presents descriptive statistics that compare single-bank firms and
multibank firms in 2011. More than 40% of our sample is made of single-bank firms
that are typically excluded from other research papers using the within firm estimator
(e.g. Gan (2007); Schnabl (2012); Andrade et al. (2015)) on multibank firms to
disentangle between supply and demand e↵ects.
The sample includes 2,407 single-bank firms and 3,361 firms multibank firms. Single-
bank firms are significantly di↵erent from multibank firms in almost every observable
dimensions but their proportion of ACC firms vs. 5+ firms. Single-bank firms are
younger and smaller. These features along with their single-bank characteristics make
asymmetries of information especially relevant for them. They default slightly less on
payment to their suppliers than their multibank counterparts. They are less levered
and experienced a stronger contraction in their use of credit in 2011 than multibank
firms, with an average growth rate in bank debt 1.5 percentage point lower than for
multibank in 2011 (-5.8% vs. -4.2%) as illustrated in figure 2.4.
Single-bank characteristics as well as the fact they are on a much more negative
credit time trend ex-ante suggest that single-bank firms could have been more credit
constrained than their multibank counterparts during the 2011 crisis. It could also
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reflect that they had a lower demand for credit maybe as a result of a higher beta with
the economy, and in this case we should not expect treated single-bank borrowers to
react to the ACC reform that creates new incentives to lend to ACC eligible borrowers.
This makes single-bank firms sample especially interesting to show evidence of a
potential di↵erence in the allocation of credit by banks during the crisis between
borrowers with di↵erent degree of information asymmetry and loan liquidity.
To understand how banks allocate their lending portfolio in times of crisis we com-
pare the intensity of their response to the one of multibank firms and we explore
heterogeneity in the response to the ACC shock within the single-bank sub-sample.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Average impact of the ACC reform
Figure 2.2 shows the average growth in debt for the whole sample of SMEs, from
2010 to 2014. All three di↵erent rating categories clearly show parallel trends in the
pre-period, as mentioned earlier, while presenting a positive e↵ect in growth in drawn
debt concurrent with the timing of the ACC reform.
[ insert Figure 2.2 ]
In figure 2.7, we plot the average of our measure of growth rate in drawn debt for
treated and for control firms, from 2010 to 2014, in the subsample of single-bank
firms only. The graph shows that the two groups follow parallel trends prior to the
ACC reform. The di↵erence between the green line (5+ firms i.e. control firms) and
the blue line (treated firms) widens after March 2012 while it is almost non-existent
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in the pre-period. This confirms that 5+ firms are similar to ACC firms in terms of
their credit growth prior to the reform.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the same e↵ect of the ACC reform but in the subsample of
multibank firms. While treated and control firm still show parallel trend before the
ACC reform the e↵ect of the ACC is weaker in the post reform period.
[ insert Figure 2.7 ]
[ insert Figure 2.8 ]
Main empirical results
Table 2.4 presents the results of the Di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimation of the impact
of the ACC framework (2012) on firm borrowings for the average firm. We find that
the reform reduced the costs for banks to lend to newly eligible borrowers.
Following literature evidence that single and multibank firms have di↵erent credit
binding constraints in crisis time (Detragiache et al. (2000)), we focus on single-bank
and multibank firms separately.
We first look at single-bank firms and find a significant positive e↵ect on newly eligible
borrowers in our baseline specification (column 3). The growth debt in debt is 6.6%
higher for treated firms than for control firms in the year after the ACC reform,
after controlling for firm time invariant characteristics and for time trends in banks’
observable and unobservable characteristics. The stability of the coe cient of interest
and its significance in all specifications (1) to (3), when we progressively saturate the
model with di↵erent set of fixed e↵ects, helps address the concern that borrowers also
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di↵ered along unobserved dimensions that are driving the e↵ect.
In columns (4) to (6) we turn to multibank firms and find a weakly significant e↵ect
of 2.5% when we aggregate both 2-bank and 3-bank groups together. Firms with
more than 3 banks show no e↵ect. In column (7), our dependent variable is the
growth in debt drawn from the main lender only. The magnitude of the coe cient
estimate (0, 020) suggests that the multibank e↵ect is almost entirely driven by the
main bank. We can thus rule out that a weak e↵ect for multibank firms is due to
firm-level adjustments of their borrowing portfolio across banks.
Finally, we estimate the e↵ect of the ACC reform on the whole sample of firms (column
10) conditional on the number of bank relationships and confirm our previous results.
Treated single-bank firms experienced an 6.8% higher credit growth than their control
counterpart and the e↵ect is significantly higher than for multibank treated firms.
[ insert Table 2.4 ]
These results support our assumption that single-bank firms were more rationed for
bank loans than multibank firms in 2011.
Interestingly the Post*Single-bank coe cient is negative and significant, with a larger
magnitude than the e↵ect of the policy itself (close to 10%). It shows that the
di↵erential time-trends between single and multi bank firms are largely una↵ected
by a change in the cost of bank lending, suggesting a deeper di↵erence in how these
borrowers are viewed by banks, despite having identical credit ratings. The negative
time path of credit also suggests that single-bank firms were constrained and that in
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the post ACC period the economic decision faced by the bank is, in general, whether
to roll over existing debt, rather than whether to finance new projects.
Table 2.5 estimates equation 2.3.2in a di↵erent sample made of micro firms only and
not included in our main analysis. It shows that the e↵ect of the ACC policy did not
materialize for the smallest firms or so called French TPE.
[ insert Table 2.5 ]
We also verify that the e↵ect on lending is not concentrated in short-term credit only.
Table 2.7 shows that both long-term and short-term debts are positively a↵ected
by the ACC reform for firms using both short and long-term debt or only financing
themselves short-term (though we have a power issue due to the very low number
of firms in this category). The e↵ect is much weaker however in the subsample of
single-bank firms that do not use short-term debt.
[ insert Table 2.7 ]
The e↵ect of the ACC reform over time
We then estimate the time dynamic of the e↵ect around the event date, taking ad-
vantage of our monthly data. We run equation 2.3.2 over an extended time period
(2010m1 to 2013m12) and present the results for the coe cient estimates in figure
2.9.
[ insert Figure 2.9 ]
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Figure 2.9 shows that the e↵ect of ACC starts to materialize after the event, in March
2012 with the largest intensity from May 2012 to August 2012, before fading out (co-
e cient estimates are still significantly positive but their magnitude is stable and
our growth measure is with respect to the first semester of 2011). Given that the
collateralization process is not immediate, a gradual e↵ect over the months follow-
ing the reform is expected. After August 2012, the combined e↵ect of the VLTRO
and of the announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by Governor
Draghi67 contributed to alleviate interbank market tensions resulting in a decline in
EURIBOR-OIS spreads . We can reasonably assume that it made central bank fund-
ing relatively less attractive at that time and that the cost of funding advantage of the
ACC disappears for banks of high enough quality to borrow in the interbank market.
Single bank firms look more credit constrained ex ante
Next we examine whether the growth in debt for treated single-bank firms resulted
in new debt (or rolled-over debt) or in debt drawn from existing credit lines. Though
undrawn debt is not pledgeable under the ACC there could still be a di↵erentiated
e↵ect on undrawn lines for treated and control firms to the extent treated firms might
want to draw on their existing lines of credit and refinance with a new loan at a more
attractive rate. In 2011 only 29% of single bank firms have undrawn credit lines worth
over five percent of their debt stock in 2011, while 50% of multi-bank firms have such
lines.
67“Conditionally on fiscal adjustments or precautionary programs enforcement by candidate coun-
tries, the ECB is allowed to trade in secondary sovereign bond markets with ”no ex ante quantitative
limits”. See Dubecq et al. (2016)for an analysis of the e↵ects of Eurosystem unconventional monetary
policy on the euro interbank market liquidity
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Table 2.6 shows that the dynamic of credit lines has not changed for single-bank
firms around the ACC reform of February 2012 (column 1). The magnitude of the
coe cient when we consider total firm debt i.e. drawn as well as undrawn is close to
the one of the e↵ect on drawn credit alone. This supports the view that single-bank
firms were more credit-constrained ex-ante and that they needed new debt financing
or the roll over of loans arrived at maturity and could not use credit lines bu↵er. On
the contrary it seems that most of the ACC e↵ect for multibank firms comes from
drawing on existing lines of credit. The e↵ect on undrawn credit lines suggests access
to better credit terms for multibank through a revealed preference argument.
[ insert Table 2.6 ]
2.5.2 Bank allocation of lending and the use of information
E↵ect of the ACC reform conditional on hard information
We then analyze how the impact of the reform varies, within single-firms, with hard
and soft information (Petersen (2004)) about the firm. We want to understand how
did bank allocate lending among borrowers, whether they use hard information, soft
information or both and to what extent, to discriminate among borrowers.
By hard information we mean quantifiable information based on financial disclosures.
Using loan applications data for new borrowers, Jiménez et al. (2014) o↵er evidence
that firm balance-sheet strength matters in crisis time to build new lending relation-
ships. We show that it matters in the intensive margin as well by analyzing how
response to our positive supply shock is related to firm characteristics that proxy for
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financial strength and degree of riskiness.
We rank firms based on leverage, trade credit use, profitability, interest coverage ratio,
tangibility of assets and age, in 2011, prior to the reform. For each of these factors,
we then create a dummy, which equals one when the firm lies in the top half of the
2011 distribution. For all characteristics but leverage this dummy can be interpreted
as signaling relatively lower risk borrowers based on hard information available to the
bank. The interpretation will be reversed in the case of leverage. We then run the
same OLS regressions as before with an additional interaction term, “Above Median”,
which captures the intensity of financial strength based alternatively on firm leverage,
trade credit, profitability, interest coverage, tangibility of assets and age.





+  0Postt ⇥ AboveMediani +  11ACCi ⇥ Postt
+ 21ACCi ⇥ Postt ⇥ AboveMediani +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t (2.3)
Table 2.8 presents the triple di↵erence estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform on
lending to firms conditional on our six proxies.
[ insert Table 2.8 ]
Within single-bank firms we find that the e↵ect of the ACC reform is stronger for firm
with low leverage, firms who are trade credit net lenders as well as for older firms.
We did not find any positive or negative impact of profitability and interest coverage
ratio. These findings suggest that only the safest firms among single-bank lenders
benefitted from the ACC supply shock. Contrary to evidence for other European
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countries (Iyer et al. (2014)), we rule out evergreening or zombie lending to riskiest
borrowers.
We next consider a di↵erent sample of so called “gazelles” or high-growth firms. These
firms play a critical role in job creation (Haltiwanger et al. (2013)), which makes it
particularly important from a policy point of view to know whether and to what
extent a reduction in banks’ cost of funding was channeled to them under the form
of more credit availability.
Firms with highest sales growth are selected based on their growth rate in sales, in
each of the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. We define gazelles either firms with sales
growth is at least equal to 10% (columns 1 and 2 of table 2.9) in each of these three
years or firms in the top quartile of the sales growth distribution in each of these
three years (columns 3 and 4 of table 2.9). Lending to treated gazelle firms increased
by 18% more than for untreated ones. The e↵ect is about three times higher than
the ACC e↵ect on credit for the average firm and is even higher within single-bank
firms.
[ insert Table 2.9 ]
Finally we construct an indicator of the intensity of the banking relationship between
a firm and its lender in 2011, the year prior the ACC reform (February 2012), to
identify frims with ex-ante high demand. We measure intensity as the ratio of the
number of months the growth rate in a firm credit is greater than 10% (proxy for new
loans) reported to the number of months the firm is in the sample (i.e. has positive
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bank debt) over the period.68We then rank firms based on their intensity of lending
in 2011 and identify firms in the top quartile of the distribution as “High Intensity”
firms. Our intensity captures a time varying demand e↵ect which is not well controlled
for by our firm fixed e↵ect. By selecting firms with ex ante higher, statisfied, demand,
we should expect them to keep having intense borowing activity ex post (which will
be captured by our Post coe cient). If this is a pure demand e↵ect then firm credit
should keep growing at the same path and there is no reason why ACC firms should
grow faster than control firms. We find evidence of this in the multibank subsample
(columns 4 to 6). For single-bank however the ACC di↵erentially increase debt growth
of treated firms by 18%. The e↵ect is not capturing frequent rolling over of short-term
debt as the magnitude of the growth in long-tem debt is about the same (column 2).
The e↵ect for smallest borrowers (below median of total assets distribution in 2011)
which are likely more constrained as they su↵er from higher information asymmetry
is stronger, which is consistent with our interpretation of ACC relaxing financing
constraints for some types of borrowers.
[ insert Table 2.10 ]
E↵ect of the ACC reform conditional on soft information
In this part we investigate the role of relationship lending and of soft information
in the transmission of the ACC supply shocks to single-bank borrowers. Literature
findings suggest that the soft information channel should be especially relevant in the
68Our results are robust to the choice of di↵erent periods of references, with varying lengths, in
2010 and 2011 and to selecting firms in the top half of the intensity distribution - with a weaker
magnitude of the e↵ect in this case. Cf. Robustness table 2.16 in Appendix.
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context of SMEs whose access to external finance is highly impaired by information
asymmetry (Berger and Udell (1995); Petersen and Rajan (1994)). The acquisition of
soft information should mitigate information asymmetry and help borrowers’ access to
credit. By soft information we mean non-measurable, borrower-specific information
that is acquired by the lender over time (length of relationship) through repeated
interactions with the firm (intensity of the lending relationship) and across a range
of di↵erent products (scope of relationship).
The early literature on the benefits of relationship banking has shown that longer
bank-firm relationships are correlated with increased credit availability (starting with
Petersen and Rajan (1994) ) and cheaper access to credit (e.g. Berger and Udell
(1995)). However, as relationship lenders acquire private information that cannot
easily be shared, it also creates a hold-up problem (Rajan (1992)). Most recent
literature contributions have looked at the e↵ect of relationship lending over the
cyle but evidence are still mixed. Consistent with Rajan’s prediction that hold-up
problems should increase with any increase in the firm’s risk of failure, Santos and
Winton (2008) show that, in downturns, relationship banks exploit their market-
power over bank-dependent borrowers by raising prices relatively more than for non-
dependent borrowers. On the bright side, Bolton et al. (2013) present theoretical and
empirical evidence, in Italy, that the information advantage acquired by relationship
lenders (identified by low distance from their borrowers’ headquarters) allows them
to provide “continuation lending” to profitable firms during a crisis.
We use several proxies for the acquisition of soft information. First we consider
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the length of the relationship. This is not our preferred measure as it has several
drawbacks. It is not informative on how close lenders and borrowers are and how
often they interact so that a long relationship could still be informationally poor.
In addition our data is censored as we cannot measure the length of the relationship
before 1998. Finally, even censoring our maximum observable relationship duration to
14 years, the average single-bank firm in our sample has a relationship length of about
8 years. The vast majority of firms in our sample thus have long bank relationships
and length is not a discriminating enough characteristics.
We thus turn to other measures such as the scope of the lending relationship. We
define our Scope variable as a dummy, which takes the value one if the firm has
other interactions with the bank based on di↵erent types of financial services such
as leasing, factoring, commercial paper or securitized loans. The results presented in
table 2.8 show no significantly higher e↵ect for treated firms with a wider relationship
scope or with a longer relationship (we use a 4-year cut-o↵ to follow the literature that
commonly used 3 or 4 years to qualify a long relationship, e.g. Bhue et al. (2016)).
Though the magnitude of the coe cient is larger for long relationships, coe cients
reported in column 2 and 3 are not statistically di↵erent.
We do find evidence of a di↵erential e↵ect of ACC however when we combine both
dimensions and look at scope and length together.
There is a mechanical correlation between long and wide relationship so that there
are very few wide relationships within the short length subsamples. Among long
bank relationships however the wider the scope the largest the e↵ect emphasizing the
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importance of the richness of the information set acquired on the quality of borrowers
(column 5) in loan granting decisions.
Despite bank loans being their main source of external finance firms with a wider
relationship scope could have compensated a reduction in bank credit supply during
the crisis with other sources of credit like trade credit. Their pure credit financed
counterparts did not have this option. Even though wide scope firms were less likely
to be as rationed as the narrow scope firms, wider scope firms, with long lending
relationship, benefit the most from the ACC supply shock which shows banks value
soft information and used it to discriminate across borrowers in their loan allocation
process.
The fact that firms with strong lending relationships experienced a larger increase in
debt compared to the average firm however may also suggest that relationship lending
for single-bank firms was not working as a countercyclical bu↵er during the crisis and
that these firms were somewhat credit rationed.
Finally in table 2.12 we do a horse race between hard and soft information using
our preferred measure of soft information (scope of the lending relationship) to test
whether they are complement or substitutes. As expected the ACC e↵ect on credit
availability does vary with firm characteristics that proxy for quality and risk (columns
1 to 6 of table 2.12) for firms on which bank has a pure credit exposure and thus a
less rich set of private information (narrow scope). The positive e↵ect of the ACC is
concentrated on low-leverage firms, net trade credit lenders and on all firms but the
youngest ones. However bank do not seem to di↵erentiate accross borrowers in the
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same manner when they have a wider and more information intensive relationship
with the borrower.
Our findings supports the view that, in downturns, when there is a positive supply
shock, strong soft information dominates.
2.5.3 The e↵ect of the ACC on payment default
We then look at potential spillover benefits of the ACC, through supply chain linkages,
by analyzing the e↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on payment default of firms
to their suppliers.
We estimate equation 2.3.2 and our dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to
one when the firm has experienced at least one payment incident during the month,
and to zero otherwise. We restrict our attention to payment incidents triggered by
insolvency issues (liquidation of the firm) or by liquidity shortages leading a firm to,
totally or partially, miss a payment to one of its suppliers. Because our sample is
composed of high credit quality firms selected based on their credit ratings, payment
default are rare events.
[ insert Table 2.13 ]
Panel A and B of Table 2.1 shows that the median firm does not experienced any
default to its suppliers and that the probability of a trade payment default is higher
for 5+ firms in general (3.1%) than for ACC firms in 2011 (2.7%). Within the
sample of single-bank firms however, there is no di↵erence between both categories of
firms. The average default rate is 2.5% for single-bank firms. Multibank firms have
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a significantly higher rate of trade payment default of 2.9% but they are also bigger
firms with more trade relationships.69
Table 2.13 shows that the ACC shock reduces the probability that single-bank firms
miss a payment to their own suppliers relative to untreated firms. Columns 4 and 5
show that there is no pre-trend as the e↵ect is insignificant in the year prior to the
reform. Firms that are eligible for the ACC framework are 0.6% less likely to default
on payments to their suppliers in the two years following the shock than firms that
are not. This reduced rate of default actually begins to have a detectable e↵ect only
six months following the shock, at which point the reduced probability of a default
event is over 1 percent relative to ineligible firms.
The results give additional support to our assumption that single-bank firms had
ex-ante liquidity constraints during the crisis and that a positive supply shock helped
them alleviating it. From a policy perspective these findings matter as the benefits of
the ACC supply shock go beyond directly treated firms and spillover to their suppliers.
There could also be a multiplier e↵ect for the treated firm as payment defaults have
been shown to be negatively and significantly correlated with a firm’s access to future
loans (Aghion et al. (2012)).
Overall, the finding that the fall in the cost of bank funds causally reduced defaults to
suppliers suggests that bank belt tightening may itself induce defaults in borrowers
that propagate through their supplier networks in crisis periods, in line with the
findings of Boissay and Gropp (2013).
69As our payment default dummy is defined on the occurrence of one default and is not scaled
by the size of the trading activity of the firms, any comparison between single and multibank firms
should be done with a lot of precautions.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper provides cleanly identified micro-evidence on how banks adjust SME lend-
ing portfolios in crisis in response to a drop in their cost of funding loans. We find
evidence that the cost of funding loans is e↵ective as a policy lever and provide
novel evidence of a causal relationship between increased bank lending and reduced
payment defaults to suppliers, potentially reducing contagion e↵ects.
We examine how bank responses vary with the extent of the private information
advantage they have about the quality of a given borrower. We find that the e↵ect of
the ACC supply shock is concentrated on firms for which lenders have an informational
monopoly i.e. single-bank borrowers.
Within single-bank firms the e↵ect is stronger among older firms, low-leverage firms,
among firms that are net providers of trade credit and among firms with an informa-
tion intensive banking relationship (a long relationship and a wide scope relationship).
Our findings can be read at two levels. Firstly, when hit by a positive supply shock,
banks use the private information acquired during the relationship in conjunction with
hard information to allocate the marginal dollar of lending to borrowers. Firm balance
sheet strength matters for the transmission of monetary shocks and so do lending
relationships. These findings are in line with the literature on the firm balance sheet
channel (Jiménez et al. (2014)) as well as the literature on the benefits of relationship
lendings (Petersen and Rajan (1995)).
We contribute to the literature by extending these results to the group of single-bank
borrowers and by providing novel evidence that for firms with longest and deepest
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bank relationships soft information use may be a substitute rather than a complement
(Deyoung et al. (2015)) for balance sheet strength.
Secondly relationship banking does not however appear to provide a strong insurance
function for single-bank firms in times of crisis as our evidence suggest that they were
more credit constrained ex-ante. We compare single-bank and multibank responses
to the ACC shock.
While the results cannot be causally interpreted - as having one or several lenders
is an endogenous decision, the determinants of which are beyond the scope of this
paper – we present a series of evidence consistent with single-bank firms being ex-
ante more financially constrained. Firms in our sample are purely bank-financed so
there is no substitution e↵ect possible between bank debt and public debt. In this
context a higher reaction to the shock suggests that these borrowers were financially
constrained ex ante.
Supporting this assumption, we also show that, within single-bank firms, the growth
in credit is not fuelled by drawing on existing credit lines and that firms with an
ex-ante higher demand (based on our novel intensity indicator as well as on their sale
dynamism i.e. “gazelles”) experienced a larger e↵ect than the average firm.
Our findings thus shed light on the darker sides of relationship banking and give
empirical support to the idea that single-bank borrowers are particularly vulnerable
to shocks to their bank, as in the Detragiache et al. (2000) model.
More generally we contribute to the empirical literature on relationship banking by
amending the view that, in downturns, closer relationships lead to better credit access
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(Bolton et al. (2013)). Having only one bank relationship may be very disadvanta-
geous in crisis periods.
Beyond the pure financing e↵ect the policy has some positive spillovers through the
supply chain via lower default rate on trade payment. There could also be a multiplier
e↵ect for the treated firms as payment defaults have been shown to be negatively and
significantly correlated with a firm’s access to future loans (Aghion et al. (2012)).
It is unclear though whether policies such as the ACC are welfare enhancing as we
have not explored yet promising future research directions looking at the e↵ects of
the policy on the other firms in the economy (in particular possible crowding out
e↵ects on untreated firms) or assessing the real e↵ects of such policies on investment
or employment .
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Figure 2.1: Empirical Design
Figure 2.1 illustrates the empirical design for our Intention to Treat estimates. Assignment to treatment
and control group is based on firm credit rating in January 2012 i.e. one month before the Additional
Credit Claim (ACC).
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Figure 2.2: Trends in Credit Growth among treated and control firms
Figure 2.2 shows the average growth rate in debt around the ACC reform (February 2012) in the treated
group and in two control groups. Assignment to treatment and control groups is based on firm credit
rating in January 2012 i.e. one month before the Additional Credit Claim (ACC). The treated group
is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms). The first control
group is made of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale
of the Banque de France). The second control group is made of 4+ rated firms (closest always eligible
borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). For each point in time, we






. The vertical line denotes the adoption of the ACC reform (February 2012).
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Outstanding amount of credit and Credit growth by number of lending relationships
Figure 2.3: Average outstanding among of drawn debt by number of Lending relationship
Figure 2.4: Average Credit Growth by number of Lending relationship
Figure 2.3 shows the average outstanding amount of drawn debt for subsamples of firms based on their
number of lending relationships. For each point in time, we plot the unconditional average of the out-
standing amount of drawn credit D
ijkt
reported in the Credit Register. Figure 2.3 shows the average
growth rate in debt for subsamples of firms based on their number of lending relationships. For each
point in time, we plot the unconditional average of the cumulative growth rate in the outstanding amount





. Single-bank firms have one lending relationship on average
in 2011. 2-bank (3-bank) firms have more than one and less than two (three) lending relationships on
average in 2011. The vertical line denotes the adoption of the ACC reform (February 2012).
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Probability of a change in credit rating in 2012
Figure 2.5: Rating Downgrade
Figure 2.6: Rating upgrade
Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of firms that experienced a downgrade of their credit rating in 2012 for
treated and control firms. Assignment to treatment and control groups is based on firm credit rating in
January 2012 i.e. one month before the Additional Credit Claim (ACC). The treated group is made of
4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms). The control group is made of
5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de
France). Figure 2.5 shows the percentage of firms that experienced an upgrade of their credit rating in
2012 for treated and control firms. After the first occurence of a change in rating (downgrade for figure
2.5 and upgrade for figure 2.5 the firm is removed from the sample. The dotted vertical line denotes the
adoption of the ACC reform (February 2012).
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Trends in Credit Growth among treated and control firms, by number of Lending relationships
Figure 2.7: Trends in Credit Growth among treated and control single-bank firms
Figure 2.8: Trends in Credit Growth among treated and control multibank firms
Figure 2.7 shows the average growth rate in debt around the ACC reform (February 2012) for treated
and control single-bank firms. Figure 2.7 shows the average growth rate in debt around the ACC reform
(February 2012) for treated and control multibank firms. Single-bank firms have one lending relationship
on average in 2011. Multibank firms have more than one and less than three lending relationships on
average in 2011. Assignment to treatment and control groups is based on firm credit rating in January
2012 i.e. one month before the Additional Credit Claim (ACC). The treated group is made of 4-rated
firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms). The control group is made of 5+ rated
firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France).
For each point in time, we plot the unconditional average of the cumulative growth rate in the outstanding





. The vertical line denotes the adoption of the ACC
reform (February 2012).
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Figure 2.9: Monthly Dynamic of the E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on Lending to
single-bank SMEs
Figure 2.9 shows the evolution of lending to single-bank firms around the ACC reform date. The spec-
ification is the same as equation 2.3.2 except that it is estimated over 2010-2013 and the 1
ACCi ⇥ Post
variable is replaced by a collection of variables 1
ACC1 ⇥
P
t>jan2011 1t where 1t is a monthly dummy. We
plot the point estimates from February 2011 (12 months prior the ACC reform) to December 2013. The
dashed lines plot the 95% confidence interval and robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Firm-level statistics (2011) – All firms
This table presents firm-level statistics for all firms. Firms rated 4 or ACC firms are the treated group (4,622 firms). Firms rated 5+ are the
control group (2,441 firms).
ACC firms 5+ firms Stat.Di↵.
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. p-val (clust)
Age 53495 22.43 19 15.39 28588 19.5 19.5 19.5 0.000
Total Assets 53495 2664 1367 11438 28588 2691 1386 17131 0.945
Nb. Employ. 53495 21.58 16 18.79 28588 21.21 16 18.74 0.440
Bank debt 53495 435 189 911 28588 565 258 1024 0.000
Leverage 53495 0.19 0.15 0.15 28588 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.000
Short-term debt / Total debt 53495 0.33 0.08 0.39 28588 0.37 0.2 0.39 0.000
g(Debt) 53495 -0.045 -0.022 0.417 28588 -0.048 -0.022 0.356 0.474
Nb. of bank relationships 53495 2.03 2 1.18 28588 2.16 2 1.33 0.000
Share of main lender (banking group) 53495 0.823 0.925 0.211 28588 0.832 0.934 0.203 0.064
Length of main bank relationship (in years) 53495 8.155 7.417 4.127 28588 7.802 6.75 3.993 0.001
Payment default dummy 53495 0.027 0.000 0.162 28588 0.031 0.000 0.172 0.059
Panel B: Firm-level statistics (2011) – Comparison between single-bank and multibank firms
This table presents summary statistics in 2011 for single-bank firms (2,407) and multibank firms (3,361) firms.
Single-bank firms Multibank firms Stat.Di↵.
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. p-val (clust)
Age 27924 19.21 17 13.89 41325 22.12 19 15.25 0.000
Total Assets 27924 1858 1166 4991 41325 2525 1311 10728 0.001
Nb. Employ. 27924 16.43 13 12.67 41325 21.4 17 17.88 0.000
Bank debt 27924 413 154 738 41325 426 206 919 0.541
Leverage 27924 0.19 0.152 0.34 41325 0.2 0.17 0.15 0.000
Short-term debt / Total debt 27924 0.22 0.16 0.19 41325 0.39 0.27 0.39 0.002
g(Debt) 27924 -0.058 -0.03 0.38 41325 -0.042 -0.019 0.413 0.000
ACC 27924 0.662 1 0.473 41325 0.667 1 0.471 0.000
Share of main lender (banking group) 27924 41325 0.78 0.82 0.18 0.704
Length of main bank relationship (in years) 27924 7.83 6.58 3.95 41325 8.04 7.25 4.15 0.047
Payment default dummy 27924 0.025 0.000 0.155 41325 0.029 0.000 0.169 0.013
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for treated and control groups
Panel C: Firm-level statistics (2011) – Single-bank firms
This table presents summary statistics in 2011, for single-bank firms. Firms rated 4 or ACC firms are the treated group (1,604 firms). Firms
rated 5+ are the control group (803 firms).
ACC firms 5+ firms Stat.Di↵.
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. p-val (clust)
Age 18480 20.5 18 13.87 9444 16.69 13 13.56 0.000
Total Assets 18480 1776 1108 5396 9444 2019 1332 4079 0.223
Nb. Employ. 18480 16.82 14 12.71 9444 15.67 13 12.57 0.036
Bank debt 18480 311 128 560 9444 612 236 967 0.000
Leverage 18480 0.18 0.13 0.16 9444 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.000
Short-term debt / Total debt 18480 0.19 0.00 0.34 9444 0.18 0.00 0.33 0.487
g(Debt) 18480 -0.061 -0.033 0.413 9444 -0.052 -0.027 0.305 0.162
Length of main bank relationship (in years) 18480 8 6.92 4.01 9444 7.49 6.25 3.8 0.001
Payment default dummy 18480 0.024 0.000 0.154 9444 0.025 0.000 0.157 0.779
Panel D: Firm-level statistics (2011) – Multibank firms
This table presents summary statistics in 2011, for multibank firms with 2-bank or 3-bank in 2011. Firms rated 4 or ACC firms are the treated
group (2,379 firms). Firms rated 5+ are the control group (1,182 firms).
ACC firms 5+ firms Stat.Di↵.
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. p-val (clust)
Age 27574 22.84 20 15.38 13751 20.68 18 14.89 0.000
Total Assets 27574 2675 1332 12580 13751 2224 1239 5327 0.140
Nb. Employ. 27574 21.54 17 17.97 13751 21.12 17 17.68 0.517
Bank debt 27574 404 195 896 13751 469 229 961 0.056
Leverage 27574 0.18 0.15 0.14 13751 0.24 0.2 0.17 0.000
Short-term debt / Total debt 27574 0.37 0.24 0.39 13751 0.42 0.34 0.39 0.002
g(Debt) 27574 -0.039 -0.018 0.427 13751 -0.048 -0.02 0.384 0.161
Nb. of bank relationships 27574 2.12 2 0.65 13751 2.11 2 0.64 0.536
Share of main lender (banking group) 27574 0.78 0.81 0.19 13751 0.8 0.83 0.18 0.014
Length of main bank relationship (in years) 27574 8.11 7.25 4.18 13751 7.9 7.08 4.07 0.159
Payment default dummy 27574 0.028 0.000 0.168 13751 0.031 0.000 0.175 0.161
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Table 2.3: Paralell Trend Tests
ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
This table presents estimates of a di↵erential time trend e↵ect for the treated firms (ACC) in the period prior to






ACCi ⇥ t+Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and
T denotes Quarters. Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. The sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly
eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the
internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable is the cumulative growth rate







election dummy takes a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Robust
standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *,
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.4: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on Lending to SMEs
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect (Intention-to-Treat) of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in outstanding credit amount to






ACCi ⇥ Postt +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes Quarters. Bankkt
is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. The sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of
5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable is the







dummy takes a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Post is a post-treatment dummy, which is
equal to 1 in each month after February 2012. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics
are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on Lending to Micro firms
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in outstanding credit
amount for a sample of micro firms. Under the French Law of Modernization of the Economy (2008) micro-firms
have less than 10 employees and sales and total assets not exceeding 2 million EUR. We follow a DID strategy and






ACCi ⇥ Postt +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and
T denotes Quarters. Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. The sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly
eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the
internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable is the cumulative growth rate







election dummy takes a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Post
is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in each month after February 2012. Robust standard errors are
clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on Undrawn Lines of Credit
E↵ect on g(Undrawn Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in undrawn debt to SMEs. We follow a DID strategy






ACCi ⇥ Postt +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes Quarters.
Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. The sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms)
and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable
is the cumulative growth rate in the outstanding amount of undrawn credit in columns 1 to 4. The dependent variable is the cumulative growth






dummy takes a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Post is a post-treatment dummy, which is
equal to 1 in each month after February 2012. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics
are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.7: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on single-bank firms conditional on debt maturity
E↵ect on g(Medium and Long-term Debt) and g(Short-term Debt)
ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower) - 2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in short and long-term debt to SMEs. We split our
main sample into three subsamples based on firm financing maturity. The first subsample is made of We follow a DID strategy and estimate






ACCi ⇥ Postt +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes Quarters.
Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. The sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms)
and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable
is the cumulative growth rate in the outstanding amount of undrawn credit in columns 1 to 4. The dependent variable is the cumulative growth







dummy takes a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Post is a post-treatment dummy, which is
equal to 1 in each month after February 2012. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics
are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.165
Table 2.8: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on single-bank firms conditional on hard information
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in debt to single-bank SMEs. We follow a DIDID





+  0Postt ⇥AboveMediani +  11ACCi ⇥ Postt +  21ACCi ⇥ Postt ⇥AboveMediani +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes Quarters.
Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC
firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France).






ACCipost-election dummy takes a
value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Postt is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in each
month after February 2012. AboveMediani is a dummy equal to 1 for firms in the top half of the 2011 distribution of leverage (1), (Account
Receivables - Debt Payables)/Assets (2), Ebitda/Total Assets (3), Ebitda/Interest Expenses (4), Age (5), Tangible CapEx/Total Assets (6).
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on “Gazelles”
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
Gazelle firms are firms with highest sale growth over the 3 years preceeding the ACC reform. This table presents
DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in debt to high growth firms or “gazelles”.










i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months
and T denotes Quarters. Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample is
made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest
non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable







a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Postt is a post-treatment
dummy, which is equal to 1 in each month after February 2012. Firms with highest sales growth are selected based
on their growth rate in sales, in each of the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. HighGrowthi is a dummy equal to 1 when
firm sales growth is at least equal to 10% (columns 1 and 2) or in the top quartile of the sales growth distribution in
each of these three years (column 3 and 4). Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009).
Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.10: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on single-bank firms conditional on intensity of credit demand
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in debt to single-bank SMEs . We follow a DIDID





+  0Postt ⇥HighIntensityi +  11ACCi ⇥ Postt +  21ACCi ⇥ Postt ⇥HighIntensityi +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes Quarters. Bankkt
is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms”
i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The






ACCipost-election dummy takes a value
of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Postt is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in each month
after February 2012. We measure credit demand intensity in 2011 as the number of month in which debt grows by more than 10% reported to
the number of months of presence (positive debt) of the firm in 2011: Intensityi = Ng(Debtit)>0.1/NDit>0. Our dummyHighIntensityi takes the
value of 1 for firms lying in the top quartile of the intensity indicator distribution. Smallest firms lie in the bottom half of the 2011 distribution
of total assets. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, **
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.11: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on single-bank firms conditional on soft information : Length and
Scope of lending relationships
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in debt to single-bank SMEs . We follow a DIDID





+  0Postt ⇥WideScopei +  11ACCi ⇥ Postt ⇥NarrowScopei +  21ACCi ⇥ Postt ⇥WideScopei +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes Quarters.
Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC
firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France).






ACCipost-election dummy takes a
value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Postt is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in each
month after February 2012. LR stands for “Length of Relationship” and measures the duration of the relationship between a firm and its bank.
NarrowScopei is a dummy equal to 1 for firms on which banks have an exposure limited to credit lending. WideScopei is a dummy equal to 1
for firms on which banks have additional exposure through leasing, factoring, commercial papers or securitization. Robust standard errors are
clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.169
Table 2.12: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on single-bank firms conditional on soft and hard information
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in debt to single-bank SMEs . We follow a DIDID





+  0Postt ⇥AbovePi +  11ACCi ⇥ Postt +  21ACCi ⇥ Postt ⇥AbovePi +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months and T denotes Quarters.
Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC
firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France).






ACCipost-election dummy takes a
value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Postt is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in
each month after February 2012. AbovePi takes the value of 1 for firms lying in the top half of the distribution of the variable in the head of
the column but for Age where AbovePi = 1if the firm is above the first quarter of the age distribution. Columns 7 to 12 estimate the model
for a subsample of firms on which banks have an exposure limited to credit lending (Narrow Scope). Columns 1 to 6 estimate the model for
the subsample of firms on which banks have additional exposure through leasing, factoring, commercial papers or securitization (Wide Scope).
Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.13: E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on Payment default
ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on payment defaults of single-bank






ACCi ⇥ Postt +Bankkt + IndjT + ✏i,s,t
i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months
and T denotes Quarters. Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample is
made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest
non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable
is a dummy variable equal to one if firm miss a payment to one of its suppliers because of liquidity or solvency
issues. Postt is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in each month after February 2012. Robust standard
errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.14: Composition of collateral pledged with the Banque de France in 2011 and in the first
half of 2012
Amounts are calculated after haircuts, in EUR bn.
Total Mean Std. p50
2011 (54 MFIs *)
Marketable securities 199.4 3.70 8.7 0.2
Non marketable 63.7 1. 6.5 0.0
Credit Claims 149.7 2.8 7.5 0.0
Total 412.8 7.6 15.4 0.8
2012s1 (59 MFIs)
Marketable securities 168.8 2.9 6.3 0.3
Non marketable 13 0.2 0.6 0.0
Credit Claims 152.9 2.6 7.2 0.0
ACC 45 0.8 3.4 0.0
Total 379.7 6.4 14.3 1.0
Source : ECB, Bignon et al. (2016)
(*) Monetary and Financial Institutions
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Table 2.15: Robustness : Di↵erent definitions of growth in credit
E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on single-bank firms
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in debt to single-bank















i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months
and T denotes Quarters. Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample is
made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms (closest
non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent variable





in columns 1 and 2. Dijkis the firm
average outstanding amount of debt in the second semester of 2011 in column 1. Dijkis the firm average outstanding
amount of debt in 2011 in column 2. Column 3 and 4 use a cumulative growth definition of g, with the base peirod
being the fist semester of 201 in column 3 and the whole year 2011 in column 4. Finally the dependendent variable
in column 5 is leverage. The 1ACCipost-election dummy takes a value of one for any firm with a rating of 4 as
of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Postt is a post-treatment dummy, which is equal to 1 in each month after
February 2012. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are
reported in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.16: Robustness : Intensity of lending relationship
E↵ect of the ACC reform (February 2012) on single-bank firms conditional on soft information
E↵ect on g(Debt) - ACC vs. 5+ firms (one notch lower)
2011m3- 2013m2
This table presents DID estimates of the e↵ect of the ACC reform (2012) on the growth in debt to single-bank











i indexes firm, j indexes industry, k indexes bank (or main lender for multibank firms), t denotes time in months
and T denotes Quarters. Bankkt is a (main) bank x month fixed e↵ects. Within single-bank firms the sample
is made of 4-rated firms (newly eligible borrowers or “ACC firms” i.e. treated firms) and of 5+ rated firms
(closest non eligible borrowers on the internal Credit Risk Rating scale of the Banque de France). The dependent





where Dijkis the firm
average outstanding amount of debt either in the first semester of 2011 (columns 1 to 3), in the whole year 2011
(column 4) or in the second semester of 2011 (column 5). The 1ACCipost-election dummy takes a value of one
for any firm with a rating of 4 as of January 2012 and zero otherwise. Postt is a post-treatment dummy, which
is equal to 1 in each month after February 2012. We measure intensity in 2011 as the number of month in which
debt grows by more than 10% reported to the number of months of presence (positive debt) of the firm in 2011:
Intensityi = Ng(Debtit)>0.1/NDit>0. Our dummyHighIntensityi takes the value of 1 for firms lying in the top half
of the intensity indicator distribution in column 1 and in the top quartile in other columns. Robust standard errors
are clustered by firm following Petersen (2009). Associated t-statistics are reported in brackets. *, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Garćıa, D. and Norli, Ø. (2012). Geographic dispersion and stock returns. Journal of Financial
Economics, 106(3):547–565.
Garicano, L. and Steinwender, C. (2015). Survive Another Day: Using Changes in the Composition
of Investments to Measure the Cost of Credit Constraints. Review of Economics and Statistics.
Greenstone, M., Mas, A., and Nguyen, H.-L. (2014). Do Credit Market Shocks a↵ect the Real
Economy? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Great Recession and âNormal’ Economic
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